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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the activities of leading and the elements of partnerships to move a 
large bureaucratic organization to a higher level of fitness and remain reliable and 
relevant in keeping the nation prepared to respond to national emergencies and domestic 
events.  The critical elements of leading and partnerships include a combination of 
building trust, sensemaking, and collaboration with all the activities of leading and 
partnerships that those elements encompass.  This combination creates the basis for 
collaborative relationships that when used correctly can help organizations to work and 
lead across boundaries to tackle the wicked problems that face homeland security 
professionals today.   
The research for this thesis is exploratory and used the methodology of grounded 
theory.  In addition, a single case was studied through the methodology of participant 
observation to collect data, which was analyzed to test the theory of collaborative 
relationships.  The analysis demonstrated the importance of relationships in creating 
collaborative efforts and partnership engagements among the many organizations that 
must work together during a national emergency.  The findings also supported the theory 
of collaborative relationships and offered examples of how to utilize such relationships in 
the complex world of homeland security and national preparedness.     
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A. INTRODUCING THE COMPLEX WORLD OF NATIONAL 
PREPAREDNESS 
Today, we live in a world of changing borders and of breathtakingly fast 
change that is stretching our ability to comprehend it, much less manage it.  
These skirting borders include those between near and far…peace and 
war…domestic and foreign…state and individual, privacy and 
surveillance…civil and military…and the border in my case between 
homeland security and homeland defense.  It is along these increasingly-
murky borders that many of the security challenges we face today 
ride…and many come home to roost in our homeland.  —Admiral 
Winnefeld, Commander NORAD and USNORTHCOM (Winnefeld, 
2011) 
Admiral Winnefeld’s statement illustrates how complex the world has become in 
the twenty-first century, and how challenging the emerging threats can be for 
organizations such as United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).   
The days of agencies, at all levels of government, operating primarily as a 
singular entity are over.  In an increasingly globalized world, policy 
challenges transcend geopolitical, socio-economic, cultural, and 
generational boundaries.  In doing so, they test conventional governments 
as never before.  Issues such as pandemics, aging populations, climate-
change, rising citizen expectations and public safety are both global and 
local in nature.  These types of complex challenges will increasingly test 
government interactions in the years to come. (Deloitte, 1–6) 
This thesis acknowledges that homeland security leaders face an ever-changing 
landscape of complex challenges that Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson refer to as “new 
hazards” in their paper on Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness.  They 
state that there is a requirement for unprecedented coordination of resources, information, 
and expertise in the face of new hazards (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2006), hazards 
that Rittel and Webber (Webber & Rittel, 1973) refer to as “wicked problems.”  They 
state that the problems of governmental planning and especially those of social or policy 
planning are ill defined and cannot be successfully treated with traditional linear, 
analytical approaches (Webber & Rittel, 1973).  Robert Horn takes it a step further and 
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refers to these hazards not as problems, but as social messes because, unlike problems, 
they do not have straightforward solutions (Horn, 2001). 
In a 2011 interview, Tom Brokaw reminds us that these wicked problems can 
push government organizations and their leaders to the edge of chaos.  That point where 
small changes in a system produce cascades of change.  In the interview he states,  
I can’t recall any other time during my adult life that a President has faced 
such a confluence of events.  Now it is the President’s job to take on big 
challenges, but few have come so swiftly and all from unexpected 
circumstances.  These challenges include fighting two wars, taking 
military action in Libya, a major earthquake and tsunami in Japan 
followed by a nuclear meltdown, a recession at home, and political 
paralysis in Washington over the budget (Brokaw, 2011). 
B. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
In order to meet these challenges in the United States, the Department of 
Homeland Security published the National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008, which is 
a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response.  The NRF states that it  
is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to 
align key roles and responsibilities across the nation.  As incidents change 
in size, scope, and complexity, the response must adapt to meet 
requirements.  The number, type and sources must be able to expand 
rapidly to meet needs associated with a given incident.  The NRF’s 
disciplined and coordinated process can provide for a rapid surge of 
resources form all levels of government appropriately scaled to need. 
(DHS, 2008)  
For the NRF to work properly, the NRF states,  
Leaders at all levels must communicate and actively support engaged 
partnerships by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities so that 
no one is overwhelmed in times of crisis.  Engaged partnerships includes 
ongoing communication of incident activity among all partners to the 
NRF, and shared situational awareness for a more rapid response. (DHS, 
2008) 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how USNORTHCOM develops 
partnership engagements in order to improve the integration of military capabilities 
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during domestic incidents.  Therefore, this thesis examines the development and 
establishment of a new program office at USNORTHCOM that was created to facilitate 
this objective.  The regional desk officer program was established by the commander of 
USNORTHCOM in November 2010 to improve his situational awareness of the state's 
capabilities and plans to respond to man-made and natural disasters.  This new program 
was designed to give him direct access to this information during times of crisis, without 
working its way through the entire organization.  This timely information would give him 
the situational awareness he needed to anticipate the support that would be requested of 
USNORTHCOM during a domestic incident therefore allowing him to prepare the 
required capabilities before the official request for assistance (RFA) was received and 
increasing the speed of USNORTHCOM’s response and integration of military 
capabilities with the requesting civil authorities.   
The mission of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is to 
conduct homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation to defend and secure 
the United States and its interest (USNORTHCOM, 2010).  However, USNORTHCOM 
must provide civil support in accordance with the NRF, which puts USNORTHCOM in a 
supporting role to civilian agencies.  The NRF states that incidents must be managed at 
the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities when 
needed.  This means an emergency must exceed the capabilities of local, state, and 
federal agencies before USNORTHCOM becomes involved.  Unfortunately, it takes 
valuable time for a request for assistance (RFA) to make its way through the bureaucratic 
process of approval because it must be approved by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense.  
Lictenstein, Uh-Bien, Marion, Seers, Orton, and Schreiber state in their paper on 
complexity leadership theory that  
a new mindset is beginning to emerge, however, which recognizes that 
social processes are too complex and “messy” to be attributed to a single 
individual, organization, or pre-planned streams of events.  (Lictenstein, 
Uhl-Bien, Seers, Orton, and Scheiber, 2006, 2–4)   
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They would consider the NRF and all-hazards response as a complex adaptive system 
(CAS) where relationships are not defined hierarchically, but rather by interaction among 
heterogeneous agents and across agent networks.  They go on to note that a CAS is 
comprised of agents or organizations, who resonate through sharing common interests, 
knowledge, and goals due to their history of interaction such as in the NRF (Lictenstein, 
Uhl-Bien, Seers, Orton, and Scheiber, 2006). 
Adding to the challenge is the fact the USNORTHCOM has few permanently 
assigned forces, even though it has the responsibility to plan, organize, and execute civil 
support missions.  Instead, it is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions 
as ordered by the president or secretary of defense (USNORTHCOM, 2011).  This 
procedure of assigning forces after the incident occurs hinders USNORTHCOM from 
developing the relationships and engaged partnerships that the NRF states are essential 
for national emergency preparedness, and causes delays in DoD response during the first 
critical days following a disaster.  This slows the response of military capabilities being 
integrated into domestic events. 
Admiral Winnefeld acknowledged these challenges during a speech in April 
2011: 
USNORTHCOM has a major role in supporting our federal and state 
partners in times of disasters.  However, time is our enemy in these 
disasters and we must search every day for ways to become more agile in 
responding to the needs of our partners.  Therefore, as military 
commanders, we must be fast and make quality decisions at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels all at once because the pace of events, 
nimble adversaries, and instant communications flows demand it.  This 
has led to the development of NORTHCOM’s first command motto 
“Velocitas cum Prundenia,” Latin for speed of wisdom and we have to 
live this every single day. (Winnefeld, 2011) 
D. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS  
In order for USNORTHCOM to improve its ability to integrate military 
capabilities in accordance with the NRF, it needs to use the activities of leading, 
combined with the elements of partnerships, to improve its ability to cooperate, 
coordinate, and collaborate with other organizations.  
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E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
1. Primary Question 
What are the activities of leading and elements of partnerships that the regional 
desk officer program uses to improve USNORTHCOM’s ability cooperate, coordinate, 
and collaborate with its federal and state partners in order to properly integrate military 
capabilities for domestic incidents? 
2. Secondary Questions 
What mechanisms or programs does USNORTHCOM use to improve 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration with its federal and state partners for 
emergency preparedness and response? 
How has the regional desk officer program improved USNORTHCOM’s ability 
to develop partnerships and integrate the use of military capabilities? 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a combination of the ethnographic research methods and 
qualitative data analysis including participant observation and grounded theory.  Social 
and behavioral scientists use the ethnographic approach to learn about the social and 
cultural life of a particular social setting.  This approach is used to solve complex social 
problems by going below the surface of issues to challenge the assumptions made about 
the topic (Schedsul & LeCompte, 1999).  By going below the surface, “ethnographic 
research is like peeling back an onion.  As you peel back the layers of an onion, you 
discover there is yet more to be seen” (National Park Service, 2010). Therefore, 
ethnographic researchers need to focus their studies on a particular topic or “lens” to view 
the social group they are studying (Schedsul & LeCompte, 1999). 
Ethnography is an approach to inquiry that uses the researcher as the primary tool 
of data collection.  It emphasizes and builds on the perspectives of the people in the 
research setting.  Therefore, it is important to adapt the research to locally appropriate 
aide of data collection or instruments that are effective in building a narrative, story, 
picture, or theory of the local culture that is predictive and produces hunches, guesses, 
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and hypotheses that can be applied to the same situation or to similar situations using the 
same research methods and data collection techniques (Schedsul & LeCompte, 1999, 5).   
1. Participant Observation 
This thesis uses the method of participant observation to collect data of the 
research setting.  It requires the researcher to become immersed in the social setting in 
order to simultaneously observe and participate in the social interactions that the 
researcher is documenting.  This method allows the researcher to participate in people’s 
everyday lives and record what is seen and heard.  “The rationale for this approach is that 
be ‘being there’ and actively taking part in the interactions at hand, the researcher can 
come closer to experiencing and understanding the ‘insiders’ point of view” (Mulcock, 
2005).  Through this observation, the researcher can collect data for meaningful analysis.  
Participant observation produces detailed descriptions of what the researcher sees and 
hears along with the researcher’s own interpretations and analysis of the data (Mulcock & 
Hume, 2005).   
G. GROUNDED THEORY 
Another characteristic of ethnographic research “is that it uses inductive, 
interactive, and recursive processes to build theories to explain the behavior and beliefs 
under study” (Schedsul & LeCompte, 1999).  Grounded theory is a systematic 
methodology in the social sciences involving the generation of theory from the collected 
data.  The first step is to perform data collection through a variety of methods including 
participant observation.  The researcher collects data and then develops a credible 
conceptual framework.  This allows the researcher to extract key points and/or trends 
from the text of the data and groups them into categories, which then become the basis 
for the creation of theory.  Therefore, grounded theory is dependent on the researcher’s 
ability to conceptualize and organize the data to make abstract connections.  This leads to 
one of the goals of grounded theory, which is to formulate or “reverse engineer” a 
hypothesis based on the conceptual ideas (Strauss & Glaser, 1967) (Glaser, 2009). This 
same process is referred to as domain and structural analysis (Spradley, 1979), and/or 
recursive analysis (McLaughlin & LeCompte, 1993).  
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H. RESEARCH DESIGN     
This thesis examines the newly formed regional desk office (RDO) program to 
determine the activities of leading and elements of partnerships that can be used to 
improve USNORTHCOM’s ability to cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate with other 
organizations.  The author used his new position as a desk officer in the RDO to observe 
and study the development of the RDO concept and program by participating in the daily 
work lives of the staffs of USNORTHCOM and the Defense Coordinating Element in 
one of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.  The study lasted 
eight months, and was accomplished through office visits, teleconferences, emails, 
meetings, and site visits at USNORTHCOM Headquarters in Colorado Springs, as well 
as federal and state agencies throughout the FEMA region.  The purpose was to record 
what was seen and heard through these multiple forms of communications in order to 
produce detailed descriptions and combine them with the author’s interpretation and 
analysis of the data as an ongoing process throughout the study.  Finally, the information 
and theories generated from the study were used to determine the key activities of leading 
and the essential elements of partnerships required to develop and maintain successful 
partnerships at USNORTHCOM in order to improve the integration of military 
capabilities during domestic events.   
I. RESEARCH TIMELINE  
November 2010   July 2011   August 2011 
______|____________________________|________________________|________ 
Observations and   Analysis   Recommendations 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
USNORTHCOM is an established geographical combatant command with over 
eight years of operational and planning experience in providing Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) within the continental United States.  Therefore, the volume of 
relevant literature on the topic is constantly growing due to congressional, departmental, 
and academic review of its performance with the passing of each significant event.  A 
general consensus in the literature is that there is a lack of interagency understanding of 
the capabilities that will be requested by civil authorities versus the capabilities that DoD 
can timely provide through USNORTHCOM in response to a catastrophic event. 
Three categories of literature are relevant to thesis.  The first reviews the 
difficulties that USNORTHCOM has had in integrating military capabilities with civil 
authorities during domestic events.  The second and third categories involve both the 
activities of leading and the elements of partnerships.  In today’s complex world of 
homeland security, combined with the reality of shrinking budgets, agencies once again 
find themselves having to do more with less.  However, the reality is that agencies at all 
levels of government must find ways to cooperate, coordinate, and integrate their 
resources and capabilities in an effective and efficient manner.  The literature on 
leadership and partnerships provide ample theories, methods, and mechanisms for 
organizations such as USNORTHCOM to work in a collaborative manner and increase 
the level of national emergency preparedness.  This chapter reviews articles and books 
that provide such guidance for organizations to follow. 
B. GOVERNMENT REPORTS 
This category of literature includes congressional reports, lesson-learned reports, 
and audits on the effectiveness of DSCA operations performed by USNORTHCOM since 
its establishment.  Nine years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States 
continues to face an uncertain, complex security environment with the potential for 
natural disasters and terrorist attacks.  However, the poorly coordinated national response 
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to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 highlighted the need for a more coordinated and integrated 
civilian and military response to a major domestic incident (D'Agostino, 2010).   
According to the White House Lessons Learned Report for Hurricane Katrina, the 
federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the DoD has the capability to 
play a critical role in the nation’s response to catastrophic events.  During the Katrina 
response, DoD demonstrated capabilities to translate presidential decisions into prompt, 
effective action on the ground.  In addition to possessing large numbers of operational 
personnel who have been trained and equipped for their missions, DoD brought robust 
communications infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities (White House, 2006). 
However, the report also highlighted various challenges in the use of military 
capabilities during domestic incidents, which slowed the application of DoD resources 
during the critical initial response.  These included separate command structures for 
active duty military and National Guard, which hindered the unity of effort, and the 
twenty-one step request for assistance (RFA) process that DoD must use to assign 
capabilities to support civil authorities, which led to critical needs not being met.  It also 
stated that DoD capabilities must be better identified and integrated into the nation’s 
response plans—before the catastrophic event occurs—to ensure the DoD is not late to 
need again.  The lesson learned was that the DHS and DoD should jointly plan for DoD 
support of federal response activities (White House, 2006).   
The DoD Office of Inspector General also concluded that USNORTHCOM and 
DoD need to improve planning and coordinating with the DHS, federal agencies, the 
National Guard Bureau, and the states.  This would enable the DoD to provide timely 
assistance to civil authorities when needed during future disasters (Scott, 2007).  
Unfortunately, these lessons were identified again during the 2007 and 2008 California 
wildfires.  The DoD inspector general concluded that USNORTHCOM unnecessarily 
used at least $3 million for civil support that potentially could have been provided by 
existing DoD assets and other agencies already in the disaster area, or through contracts.  
Once again, this highlights the lack of understanding by senior DoD leadership of what 
the DoD capabilities will be required to support civil authorities during a disaster 
(Jolliffe, 2010).   
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The Advisory Panel on DoD Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities 
published a report in September 2010 outlining imperatives for enhancing defense 
support of civil authorities for the Secretary of Defense and Congress.  The report found 
that the emergency response community has long understood that the foundation for 
effective response to a catastrophic incident consists of effective planning, information 
sharing, coordination, and preparation before the incident occurs.  However, the advisory 
panel concluded that policies and institutions impede the information sharing and 
coordination that are required to substantially improve national preparedness.  It also 
concluded that the defense coordinating officer (DCO)/defense coordinating elements 
(DCE) that are assigned to each FEMA region will be unlikely to perform all missions to 
ensure adequate preparation, planning, and response for catastrophes.  Furthermore, the 
existing DCO/DCE structure cannot scale up sufficiently to effectively perform its 
missions during a large-scale incident because it does not have a staff sized or structure to 
exercise command and control of anything by a small federal military force (Advisory 
Panel on DoD Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities, 2010).   
Unfortunately, five years after Hurricane Katrina, issues remain about the DoD’s 
ability to provide defense support of civil authorities for catastrophic events.  While the 
DoD has assigned DCO/DCE to coordinate civilian requests-for-assistance, it has not 
clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and command/control relationships.  Nor has it 
conducted a formal staffing needs assessment that accounts for difference across FEMA 
regions, and has not identified the capabilities it will be asked to provide during a 
catastrophic event (D'Agostino, 2010). 
As stated above, many documents have been written over the years directing the 
DoD and USNORTHCOM to plan and execute DSCA operations.  Even more literature 
has reviewed and critiqued these operations after events, with recommendations to 
improve planning, coordinating, and executing DSCA operations.  However, there is a 
noticeable gap in literature that proposes processes to improve integration of DoD 
capabilities required by civil authorities during a catastrophic event.   
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C. LEADERSHIP 
The articles and books in this category of literature explore the state of leadership 
over the past two decades, which has made a departure from focusing on the 
characteristics and traits of the individual leader.  Instead, the literature has been leaning 
towards the importance of examining the activities of leading.  The problem with the 
traditional understanding of leadership is that well-intended leaders fortify the silo 
mentality of agencies, instead of working across organizational lines and boundaries, in a 
coordinated effort to improve national preparedness (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2006). 
1. Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness 
Today’s complex homeland security environment requires an array of government 
and non-government organizations to cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate to increase 
the speed and effectiveness of national preparedness and response.  Marcus, Dorn, and 
Henderson state that “leaders who are able to influence and accomplish such 
collaboration of effort across organizations—multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency, and 
public-private—are termed meta-leaders.”  They go on to state that meta-leaders do not 
derive their power from formal positions.  Instead, they influence other organizations by 
effective negotiation and the development of personal and organizational creditability 
that reaches across organizational boundaries.  They chart new courses in coordination 
with a range of external organizations outside their organizational experience or 
responsibility (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2006). 
2. Where Military Professionalism Meets Complexity Science 
In this article, the authors discuss and explore key leadership tasks for complex 
adaptive systems:  
- Relationship building: leading in a complex adaptive system requires 
focusing more attention on relationship building instead of defining 
roles for people. 
- Loose coupling:  when problems are poorly defined and the 
environment is uncertain, complex and ambiguous, loose coupling 
enhances organizational adaptability because it allows more degrees of 
freedom in the organization. 
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- Complicating: trying to keep things simple and use a predesigned 
formula and sticking to it can lead to a disaster.  Instead, leaders must 
develop complicated sets of information-driven networks the will 
enable the creation of order. 
- Diversity: when a complex incident occurs, leaders need differing 
points of view in order to adapt correctly to the situation. 
- Sensemaking: when a system is unknown, sensemaking becomes 
more important than decision making.  Before decisions can be made, 
leaders must have a notion or sense of what is going on around them.   
- Learning:  the task for leaders in a CAS is to create a learning 
organization that values information sharing and teamwork. 
- Improvising: this is needed when complex events unfold quickly and 
the organization must respond to it. (Paparone, Anderson, & 
McDaniel, 2007) 
  
3. Complexity Leadership Theory: An Interactive Perspective on 
Leading in Complex Adaptive Systems 
In this article, the authors propose that  
leadership (as opposed to leaders), can be seen as a complex dynamic 
process that emerges in the interactive “spaces between” people and ideas.  
That is, leadership is a dynamic that transcends the capabilities of 
individuals alone; it is the product of interaction, tension, and exchange 
rules governing changes in perception and understanding that they label as 
a dynamic of adaptive leadership.   
They go to explain that effective leadership does not reside within the leader’s 
symbolic, motivational, or charismatic actions.  Instead, the notion of leadership is that it 
 is an emergent event, an outcome of relational interactions among agents.  
As such, adaptive leadership does not mean getting followers to follow the 
leader’s wishes; rather, leadership occurs when interacting agents generate 
adaptive outcomes. (Lictenstein, Uhl-Bien, Marion, Seers, Orton, & 
Schieber, 2006) 
4. The Importance of Flexible Leadership 
In his article, Gary Yukl reviews a sampling of the literature on adaptive 
leadership.  He explains that research on leadership provides strong evidence that 
flexible, adaptive leadership is essential, especially when there is substantial change in 
the situation (Yukl, 2008).  Yukl notes that several skills are relevant for flexible, 
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adaptive leadership; these include the ability to understand the situational requirements 
for effective leadership and to be flexible in adapting to changing conditions and crises 
(Senge, 1990).  Situational awareness and social intelligence both involve a person’s 
ability to identify and understand the leadership situation, including social and political 
processes and relationships.  Social intelligence also includes the ability to select an 
appropriate response and to be flexible on one’s behavior (Zaccarro, Gilbert, Thor, & 
Mumford, 1976). 
5. Sensemaking and Sensegiving in Strategic Change Initiation 
Gioia and Chittipeddi utilize the metaphors of sensemaking and sensegiving as 
means to bring about strategic change in an organization.  They state,  
Strategic change involves an attempt to change current modes of cognition 
and action to enable the organization to take advantage of important 
opportunities or to cope with consequential environmental threats.   
To bring about this change, leaders must make sense of a new or complex situation, 
which is referred to as sensemaking.  This is followed by the leadership providing some 
guiding vision of the changed organization to all stakeholders, which is the process called 
sensegiving.  Therefore, the metaphors of “sensemaking” and “sensegiving” broaden the 
concept of leading activities during the period of change (Chittipeddi & Gioia, 1991).  
6. A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making 
In this article, David Snowden describes his decision-making model, based on a 
sensemaking  framework that he refers to as the Cynefin Framework.  This framework 
can be used by both leaders and the collective organization to make better decisions.  
Snowden realizes that we all have different backgrounds and experiences that influence 
us in ways we can never understand, and that have a profound effect on the way we make 
decisions.  Therefore, the premise of the Cynefin Framework is that leaders learn to 
define the framework with examples from their own organization’s history and scenarios  
of its possible future.  This can be done through simple storytelling, which enhances 
communication and helps leaders to quickly understand the context in which they are 
operating (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
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Snowden explains that there are three domains in this framework: ordered, 
complex, and chaotic.  However, in the framework, the ordered domain is divided into 
simple and complicated, and adds in an area known as disorder.  The key to the Cynefin 
Framework is that when a problem develops for an organization, the leader must 
understand the context of the problem.  Once understood, the leader can then make the 
appropriate type of decision.  The problem is when a leader does not understand the 
context and is therefore in danger of using the wrong decision type.  When this happens, 
the leader is in the area known as disorder and usually falls back on prior experience to 
make a decision—the thought process being that past success will lead to success in the 
future (Snowden & Boone, 2007).  
 
 
        Disorder  
Figure 1.   Cynefin Model (From Snowden, 2009) 
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D. THEORY OF PARTNERSHIPS 
The articles and books in this category of literature not only define partnerships, 
but describe common aspects, characteristics, or elements that are crucial for the success 
of any partnership.  Starting with a working definition, Mohr and Spekman define 
partnerships as  
purposive strategic relationships between independent firms who share 
compatible goals, strive for mutual benefit, and acknowledge a high level 
of mutual interdependence.  They join efforts to achieve goals that each 
firm, acting alone, could not. (Spekman & Mohr, 1994)   
Partnerships emerge in response to a problem and when people feel that the benefits 
exceed the costs.  The benefits of participating include prior mutual respect, perceived 
need for collaboration, a history of working together, and the expectation of a payoff 
from sharing information and resources.  However, participation is unlikely when people 
have a history of disrespect, when their turf is threatened, and when they fear that they 
will not get sufficient credit for their contribution (Rosenbaum, 2002).  Therefore, the key 
elements that enable partnerships are collaboration, relationships, and trust.   
1. Partnering Theory and Practice, Jim Walsh (Walsh, 2011) 
In his article, Walsh states that the partnering process implies a commitment to 
working towards common objectives; having high level of mutual trust; a willingness to 
co-operate, share responsibility and accept accountability; and, where necessary, to alter 
the prevailing institutional structures.  This requires that each partner accepts agreed 
objectives based on negotiation between partners coming from different perspectives.  
This aspect of partnerships is likely to require fundamental changes in attitude and 
priorities.  This challenge can be overcome gradually through constant nurturing, 
managing, and reinforcing.  The article goes on to conclude that all partnerships should 
ensure the following: 
- Each actor has a recognized role and a clear idea of the benefits to 
them. 
- That representatives on the partnership structures are committed 
individuals with significant authority and influence within their 
respective organizations. 
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- That there are clear communication lines between partners and 
effective boards, committee and form structures. 
- That partnership structures are able to adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
2. Characteristics of Partnerships Success: Mohr and Spekman 
(Spekman & Mohr, 1994) 
Mohr and Spekman explain their hypothesis about partnerships in their article.  
Their hypothesis states, more successful partnerships, compared with less successful 
partnerships, exhibit higher levels of:  
- Commitment: Because more committed partners will exert effort and 
balance short-term problems with long-term goal achievement, higher 
levels of commitment are associated with partnership success. 
- Coordination:  Without high levels of coordination, processes fail and 
any planned mutual advantage cannot be achieved.   
- Interdependence:  Both parties recognize that the advantages of 
interdependence provide benefits greater than either could attain 
singly.   
- Trust:  Is highly related to firms’ desires to collaborate.  Relationships 
featuring trust will be able to manage greater stress and will display 
greater adaptability.  
3. Partnership Synergy: A Practical Framework for Studying and 
Strengthening the Collaborative Advantage – Lasker, Weiss, and 
Miller 
In their article, Lasker, Weiss, and Miller pull from multiple articles to 
demonstrate the importance of collaboration within partnerships.  They state that the 
substantial interest and investment in collaboration is based on the assumption that 
collaboration enhances the capacity of people and organizations to achieve goals (Lasker, 
Weiss, & Miller 2001).  Gray defined collaboration as 
a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can 
explore constructively their differences and search for solutions that go 
beyond their own limited vision of what is possible. (Gray, 1989)    
Others describe collaboration as a process that enables independent individuals and 
organizations to combine their human and material resources so they can accomplish 
objectives they are unable to bring about alone (Kanter, 1994).   
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The power to combine the perspectives, resources, and skills of a group of people 
and organizations has been called synergy.  Clearly, the synergy created by collaboration 
can be very powerful.  The raw materials for synergy are the people and organizations 
that come together in a partnership.  Collaborations with diverse participants, whose 
heterogeneous traits, abilities, and attitudes bring complementary strengths to the table, 
may have the greatest potential to solve problems (Mays, Halverson, & Kaluzny, 1998). 
4. Evaluating Multi-Agency Anti-Crime Partnerships: Theory, Design, 
and Measurement Issue – Dennis P. Rosenbaum (Rosenbaum, 2002) 
 In this article, Rosenbaum describes the dynamics of partnerships, which include: 
- Social cohesion:  To what extent can the partnership be characterized 
as a cohesive group, where members feel positively toward one 
another, enjoy working together, and are committed to make the 
partnership a success? 
- Cooperation: Good organizational climate implies limited conflict 
among members.   
- Coordination: Occurs when agencies within the group take into 
account each other’s actions when making decisions 
- Interaction Patterns:  Long-standing coalitions are characterized by 
frequent meetings with high attendance and good channels of internal 
communications 
As Rosenbaum explains, the health of partnerships will be reflected in these social 
dynamics among group members.  Therefore, the group’s social relations and ability to 
communicate directly will affect the group’s ability to reach an agreement on problems 
and to execute a plan of coordinated action (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
5. Working Across Boundaries: Making Collaboration Work in 
Government – Russell Linden (Linden, 2002)  
In his book, Linden creates a working definition for collaboration: 
 collaboration occurs when people from different organizations (or units 
within one organization) produce something together through joint effort, 
resources, and decision making, and share ownership of the final product. 
 Linden believes that organizations collaborate for several reasons: 
- To achieve cost savings through economies of scale 
 19 
- Ability to create something that you can’t create on your own  
- Higher quality of service for the end user 
- Potential for organizational learning  
- Better ability to achieve important outcomes 
Linden goes on to describe that relationships are the glue that binds collaborative 
efforts.  He states, 
Poor relationships will kill almost any alliance; because without strong 
relationships, there’s no trust, and without trust there will be no 
collaboration.  When trust has been built, people are usually willing to 
give one another the benefit of the doubt and take small risks with each 
other.   
A key aspect of his book is his list of some of the ways people develop relationships in 
their collaborative efforts: 
- Begin meetings by getting reacquainted and getting people to 
reconnect 
- Use open and candid communications such as self disclosure or 
acknowledging the other person’s point of view even if you disagree 
with it 
- Build trust by giving the parties a chance to be accountable 
- Learn to collaborate by listen carefully to the other parties 
- Provide and share credible information when it is requested or even 
before it is requested 
- Use stories to communicate messages 
- Make time for relationships and trust 
- Create a sense of Entity through a shared past and envisioned future 
6. The Speed of Trust – The One Thing That Changes Everything – 
Stephen Covey (Covey, 2006) 
In his book, Covey states:  
There is one thing that is common to every individual, relationship, team, 
family organization, nation, economy, and civilization throughout the 
world, one thing, which, if removed, will destroy the most powerful 
government, the most thriving economy, the most influential leadership, 
the greatest friendship, the strongest character, the deepest love.  On the 
other hand, if developed and leveraged, that one thing has the potential to 
create unparalleled success and prosperity in every dimension of life.  Yet, 
it is the least understood, most neglected, and most underestimated 
possibility of our time.  That one thing is trust. 
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He goes on to define trust in the words of Jack Welch, former CEO of General 
Electric.  He said, “You know it when you feel it.”  Simply put, trust means confidence.  
The opposite of trust—distrust—is suspicion.  When you trust people, you have 
confidence in them—in their integrity and in their abilities.  When you distrust people, 
you are suspicious of them—or their integrity, their agenda, their capabilities, or their 
track record.  Covey believes that trust is a function of both character and competence.  
Your character includes your integrity, motive, and intent with people, and competence, 
which includes your capabilities, skill, results, and track record.   
Covey also quotes Jim Burke, Former Chairman and CEO, Johnson & Johnson: 
You can’t have success without trust.  The word trust embodies almost 
everything you can strive for that will help you to succeed.  You tell me 
any human relationship that works without trust, whether it is a marriage 
or a friendship or a social interaction; in the longrun, the same thing is true 
about business, especially business that deals with the public. 
Covey states that trust is a function of two things that are vital to building trust, 
which are character and competence.  Character includes your integrity, motive, and 
intent with people, while your competence includes your capabilities, skills, results, and 
track record.  He goes on to explain that they are equally important elements because a 
person may be sincere, even honest, but you will not fully trust them if they do not get 
results.  The opposite is also true.  A person who possesses great skill and talents, with an 
excellent track record, but is not an honest person, should not be trusted (Covey, 2006).   
E. THEORY OF COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS 
This literature review, as a whole, demonstrates similarities between the activities 
of leading and the elements of developing successful partnerships.  Based on these 
similarities, a theory of collaborative relationships was derived by synthesizing the 
literature cited above.  The important activities of leading and elements of partnerships 
that are the basis for collaborative relationships include: 
- Trust:  
o Empowering each party and holding them accountable   
o Creating confidence by being competent and having integrity 
o Sharing credible information even before it is requested  
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- Sensemaking: 
o Gaining situational awareness 
o Creating an atmosphere that allows for learning through such mechanisms 
as trial and error 





o Listening to each party 
o Using open and candid communications  
o Building social cohesion through informal interactions 
o Creating a unified effort by developing interdependence through shared 
experiences, goals, and vision 
o Creating buy-in 
When used correctly, these elements and activities can be used in combination to 
help organizations to work and lead across boundaries to tackle the wicked problems that 
face homeland security professionals today.  This sampling of literature demonstrates that 
there are methods and skills that leaders at all levels can use to move their organizations 
to a higher level of fitness, and develop the engaged partnerships that are required by the 
National Response Framework.  However, what is not provided in this literature is an 
example of how these activities and elements come together in a large bureaucratic 
organization that is attempting to increase its level of fitness and remain reliable and 
relevant in keeping the nation prepared to respond to national emergencies and domestic 
events (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
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III. PROVIDING CIVIL SUPPORT AT UNITED STATES 
NORTHERN COMMAND   
Partnerships: More than any other commands I’ve observed, we are 
dependent on healthy collaboration with other nations and 
organizations…..USNORTHCOM will further tighten our collaboration 
and a variety of key domestic partners, foremost among which are the 
Department of Homeland Security, the National Guard, and the 
Intelligence Community.  We will indicate to all of these organizations our 
eagerness to work on a trusting and transparent basis in order to better 
accomplish our overlapping missions. —Admiral James A. Winnefeld, 
Commander, USNORTHCOM 
A. INTRODUCING THE CASE  
The previous chapter provided literature that described the activities and elements 
organizations should use to develop successful partnerships.  The purpose of this chapter 
is to give the reader an insight and understanding into USNORTHCOM’s willingness and 
desire to build partnerships with organizations that it must support during domestic 
events.  Therefore, this chapter provides information on the history, vision, and 
organization of USNORTHCOM, to give the reader an understanding of how it is 
organized to provide civil support.  This chapter also describes the multiple organizations 
within USNORTHCOM that have overlapping duties and responsibilities to coordinate 
with its federal and state partners, and to provide situational awareness to the commander 
during times of domestic crises that have led to confusion both internally and externally.   
B. BACKGROUND 
In response to the terrible events of September 11, 2001, senior leaders in DoD 
began planning for the establishment of a combatant command whose primary mission 
would be to defend the U.S. homeland.  On April 19, 2002, the 226th anniversary of the 
shot heard around the world at the Battle of Lexington, President Bush authorized the 
establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to consolidate, under a 
single unified command, those existing homeland defense and civil support missions that 
were previously executed by other military organizations (USNORTHCOM, 2011). 
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C. VISION 
The commander’s vision is that NORTHCOM will be: 
- Forward-looking, responsive, and agile 
….ahead of every problem, overcoming barriers to speed, adapting 
quickly 
- Effective and relevant at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels 
…Focused on the right issues at the right levels at the right time 
…Adept in understanding and managing risks 
- Well-known for collegiality, integrity, competence, and humility 
…Always a welcome partner in any activity or contingency 
- Eager to push boundaries of how we perform our missions 
…At the leading edge of technical and process innovation 
- Internally synchronized and externally understood 
…A well-informed, fully aligned, and confident staff 
…Tuned to the many audiences in our communications space 
(USNORTHCOM, 2011) 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, this vision demonstrates the elements of 
partnerships.  It states that NORTHCOM, as an organization, will be known for both its 
character and competency.  It will also communicate effectively with external 
organizations while being confident in its own abilities, and will be relevant and flexible 
to its partners needs. 
D. ORGANIZATION   
Multiple pre-existing programs and organizations located throughout 
USNORTHCOM have the role and responsibility to communicate with civil authorities 
to integrate military capabilities and planning for domestic incidents.  The following 
organizational charts depict the component commands of USNORTHCOM, followed by 
the Headquarters Staff organizations of USNORTHCOM.  Many of these organizations 
have a direct role in coordinating with federal and state partners to provide civil support 




Figure 2.   USNORTHCOM Component Commands  
 
Figure 3.   USNORTHCOM Headquarters Chart 
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1. U.S. Army North (ARNORTH)   
ARNORTH is a subordinate command of USNORTHCOM.  Its mission states: 
ARNORTH, the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) and 
Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to USNORTHCOM, 
conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations and Theater 
Security Cooperation activities in order to protect the American people 
and our way of life.  One of its key tasks includes coordinating the 
activities of Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) and their elements 
(DCE) assigned in each Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) region. 
ARNORTH has ten assigned defense coordinating officers (DCOs) and assigned 
one to each FEMA region.  If requested and approved, the DCO serves as the DoD’s 
single point of contact at the joint field officer (JFO).  With few exceptions, requests for 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) originating at the JFO are coordinated 
with, and processed through the DCO.  The DCO has a defense coordinating element 
(DCE) consisting of a staff and Emergency Preparedness Military Liaison Officers to 
facilitate coordination and support to activated Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).  
(ARNORTH, 2010) 
2. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)     
Duty Description of the Defense Coordinating Officer:  Command and 
control of permanently assigned staff and Operational Control of Army 
Emergency Planning Liaison Officers (EMPLOs).  Provide subject matter 
expertise for state and federal emergency response plans, emergency 
preparedness oversight with military installations regarding Base Support 
Installation Operations, and readiness oversight for designated /dedicated 
Homeland Defense (HD)/Civil Support (CS) Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) forces.  Perform as a key 
player in local, state, federal, and DoD HLD/CS exercises.  Represent 
DoD in the disaster area providing liaison to state and other federal 
agencies, validating mission assignments from the FCO and determining 
the best military resources for specific missions. DCO Responsibilities: 
(ARNORTH, 2010) (Dept. of the Army, 2009) 
 
- Subject matter expert for all state and federal emergency response 
plans. 
- Build synergy & habitual relationships with:  
o FEMA Staff 
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o State Emergency Responders 
o State Adjutants General and State Joint Force Headquarters 
staff 
- Key player in all local, state, federal, and DoD Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support exercises. 
- Maintains liaison with the Regional Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) Headquarters and other federal agency partners. 
- Maintains situational awareness of developing situations involving 
state, regional, and federal agencies, and potential terrorist 
intelligence, as well as DoD Active Component, and Reserve 
Component units, facilities, and capabilities. 
- Oversight with all military installations regarding Base Support 
Installation (BSI) operations. 
- National Special Security Event (NSSE) planning and support. 
- Be prepared to conduct operations in another region. 
DCE Responsibilities: (ARNORTH, 2010) (FEMA, 2011)  
- Deploy consistent with current response plans. 
- Represent the DoD in the disaster area. 
- Provide liaison to state, local, and other federal agencies. 
- Validate Mission Assignments for the Federal Coordinating Officer. 
- Determine the best military resource for the mission. 
State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) responsibilities: 
(ARNORTH, 2010) (FEMA, 2011) 
- DoD liaison with states and federal agencies for Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities 
- Visibility with the National Guard in the state 
- Observe and participate in training exercises 
- Maintain situational awareness within the state 
Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (REPLOs) responsibilities: 
(ARNORTH, 2010) (FEMA, 2011) 
- Subject matter experts for the Region and on the DoD Services 
- Highly trained in Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) and Mission 
Assignment development 
- Staff reserve element for the DCE 
Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations Officers (JRMPOs) 
(USNORTHCOM, 2009): 
- Provides subject matter expertise related to DoD medical assets within 
the area of regional responsibility. 
- Provide subject matter expertise related to state and regional non-DoD 
medical capabilities. 
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- Provide Health Service Support (HSS) plans and operations assistance 
to DCOs, Services, and SEPLOs) within designated regions. 
- Provide regional/state plans and operations expertise/input to the 
NORTHCOM Headquarters, its components, and elements. 
- Provide interagency HSS plans and operations support through active 
participation in meetings with the FEMA Regional Interagency 
Steering Committee (RISC). 
- Provide HSS input on plans to NORAD and USNORTHCOM Family 
of Plans, Service Planning and Regional/State Public Health and 
Emergency Manager/Coordinators and orders generated during 
NORTHCOM DSCA operations. 
- Maintain regional interagency relationships through relationship 
building. 
 
3. USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination (IC) Directorate    
The Interagency Coordination Directorate is designed to be a relationship 
builder that facilitates, coordinates and synchronizes sharing and activity 
across organizational boundaries.  Its mission is to integrate and the 
synchronize USNORTHCOM interagency activities to ensure mutual 
understanding, unity of effort, and full spectrum support. 
(USNORTHCOM, 2011)  USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination 
(IC) Directorate Functions: (USNORTHCOM, 2011) 
 
- Serves as the Command’s leader, manager, and coordinator on 
interagency operations. 
- Focuses on building effective, durable, and lasting relationships 
between USNORTHCOM and federal, state, and non-governmental, 
commercial, and private sector agencies; agencies that partner in 
Counter Terrorism (CT), civil support, and address the asymmetric 
threats against the homeland. 
- Develops and fosters close interagency cooperation and 
interoperability to ensure synchronization of activities, mutual 
understanding, and unity of effort.  Interacts with senior level 
combatant command (COCOM), National Agency, and Allied 
Government personnel on a daily basis. 
- Leads and manages the interagency effort through the tiered 
emergency response levels during exercises, contingencies, and war.   
4. USNORTHCOM Directorate of Operations (J-3)   
The mission of the directorate of operations is to be the principal advisor 
to the commander of USNORTHCOM on all operational matters, 
providing strategic guidance to plan and execute USNORTHCOM 
 29 
missions including air, land, maritime, ballistic missile defense, and cyber 
homeland defense operations, as well as Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities. (USCG, 2011)   
This is accomplished through several divisions including the Current Operations 
Division (J33), which provides the commander of USNORTHCOM situational awareness 
of operations information from across the commands, regions, and components of 
USNORTHCOM.   
The mission of the Current Operations Division is to assess, synchronize, 
facilitate all current operations and exercises within the NC AOR while 
maintaining situational awareness of the operational environment, 
assessing emergent information, and operational impacts upon current and 
future operations in order to produce actionable knowledge and 
understanding for senior leader decisions and future operations. 
(USNORTHCOM, 2011) 
USNORTHCOM Domestic Operations (DOMOPS):  
The Domestic Operations Division within the Operations Directorate of 
USNORTHCOM provides the commander with the scalable capability to 
form the core of a Joint Task Force or enable multiple organizations in 
order to anticipate and conduct homeland defense and civil support 
missions anywhere in USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility during 
planned or crisis operations while providing programmatic oversight of 
the Contingency Dual Hat Status Commander (CDSC). (USNORTHCOM, 
2011)   
5. Contingency Dual Hat Status Commander Program   
The CDSC concept is intended to achieve unity of effort when federal 
support is needed to support a state during a disaster.  It allows a single 
commander to direct federal and state resources to better coordinate 
domestic incident responses.  Its purpose is to allow USNORTHCOM to 
support the state joint force headquarters commander’s staff with some 
federal expertise, should the state desire it.  Therefore, USNORTHCOM 
will assign Title 10 active duty deputy commanders who will be trained 
alongside the state CDSC’s.  USNORTHCOM can also leverage a staff 
element from DOMOPS to also support the state joint force headquarters 
staff. (NGB, 2011)  
The contingency dual-status commander concept is intended to foster 
greater cooperation among federal and state assets during a disaster. 
(USNORTHCOM, 2011) 
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This chapter outlined the many organizations and mechanisms that 
USNORTHCOM relies on to coordinate with interagency partners.  However, these 
multiple organizations with overlapping interests and/or equities can overwhelm 
interagency partners who may not be staffed to respond to these multiple organizations.  
It may also lead to confusion for both federal and state partners with whom they are 
talking.  This can actually cause damage to the very partnerships that USNORTHCOM is 
attempting to develop, foster, and maintain in order to increase its speed of response in 




IV. REGIONAL DESK OFFICER (RDO) STORY AND ANALYSIS 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGIONAL DESK OFFICER PROGRAM 
The previous chapter described the multiple organizations within 
USNORTHCOM that have overlapping duties and responsibilities to communicate and 
coordinate with federal and state agencies as well as other organizations.  These 
organizations are also responsible for keeping the commander informed about these 
interactions to include partner capabilities to respond to domestic events and 
environmental threats that may require USNORTHCOM support of civil authorities.  
However, this information must work its way through USNORTHCOM and the chain of 
command before it is briefed to the commander.  This causes the information to be 
delayed and possibly altered while it goes through an approval process at each level of 
leadership.  Therefore, the commander created a new organization that would report 
directly to him with real-time information that included raw data and insight into the 
capabilities that existed in the FEMA regions and the environmental concerns our federal 
and state partners had in their specific regions.  This new organization is called the 
regional desk office, which is responsible to administer the regional desk officer program.  
This chapter contains observations on the development, implementation, and 
refinement of the regional desk officer program at USNORTHCOM.  The observations 
were made while the author fully participated in the program over an eight-month period 
as a regional desk officer.  The purpose of this chapter is to present these observations to 
the reader in a manner that allows the data to be analyzed to determine lessons learned 
that can be used to develop strategic partnerships in other public bureaucratic 
organizations. 
B. CYNEFIN SENSEMAKING FRAMEWORK 
1. Creation of the Regional Desk Officer Program 
The concept for the regional desk officer program was developed during the 
summer of 2010 by a working group made up of representatives from across the 
command.  The working group was formed shortly after Admiral Winnefeld took 
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command in order to develop a new capability that would provide him real time 
information at the state level during a domestic event.  According to members of the 
working group, the purpose of this new capability was to enhance partnership building 
between USNORTHCOM and the states while providing the commander situational 
awareness on the capabilities and gaps of each state that would require military support 
during a crisis.   
The members of the working group commented that they had received minimal 
direction from the commander at the beginning.  The commander simply stated that he 
wanted a group of subject matter experts (SMEs) on the states that he could reach out and 
touch during times of crisis.  Therefore, the working group was convinced that a problem 
did not exist and they only needed to develop a new capability in response to the 
commander’s desire for direct access to information. 
This concept of having action officers become SMEs for each state is not a new 
idea.  The Joint Staff and other combatant commands have established “Country Desk 
Officer” programs.  In those programs, action officers are assigned specific countries and 
become subject matter experts on them.  They also have the responsibility to get approval 
for DoD members to travel into their assigned country or countries for conference, 
exercises, meetings, and operations.  Their day-to-day responsibility is to be the link for 
coordination and information flow between the commandant command or Joint Task 
Force and the country coordination elements in each of the different American embassies 
in the combatant commands area of responsibility.  They also facilitate connecting the 
embassies with the correct directorate or person when embassies have questions or 
concerns relating to military matters.  The bottom line is that the country desk officers are 
a coordination element between DoD and U.S. Embassies.  
As one member of the working group stated, 
We immediately determined that the USNORTHCOM could not afford to 
have an actions officer dedicated for each state, so we decided that each 
course of action (COA) would include only ten regional action officers 
that would be aligned with the FEMA regions and Defense Coordinating 
Officers.  We also made the conscience decision not to perform a mission 
analysis to determine the duties and responsibilities of this new office 
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because we figured they would be developed later by the office itself.  
Therefore, we simply designed feasible courses of action considering the 
limited resources that were available.   
2. Analyzing the Initial Decision to Develop a Regional Desk Officer 
Program 
When we consider the decisions that leaders make and attempt to study them, it is 
useful to utilize a framework in which to analyze the data.  In this case, David Snowden 
developed a decision-making model he developed based on a sensemaking framework 
that he calls the Cynefin Model.  David Snowden said 
 Its value is not as much in logical arguments or empirical verifications as 
in its effect on the sensed-making and decision-making capabilities of 
those who use it.  It gives decision makers powerful new constructs that 
they can use to make sense of a wide range of unspecified problems. 
(Snowden, 2003)   
By using this model, we can drill down and study each decision along the 
development, implementation, and refining phases of the regional desk officer concept.  
The Cynefin Model is considered a decision-making model and by using it, the decisions 
that were made from the development of the regional desk officer concept through 
implementation and refinement can actually be tracked and analyzed.  Upon taking 
command, the commander decided to employ a regional desk officer concept because he 
sensed he was not getting information quickly enough to make timely decisions about 
civil support (Snowden, 2003). 
As the combatant commander, he is ultimately held responsible by the Secretary 
of Defense to ensure the quick and effective integration of DoD capabilities to support 
civilian authorities during domestic events.  He had recently completed the nomination 
process and congressional confirmation hearings in order to take command of 
USNORTHCOM.  Therefore, he was well aware of the reports that criticized 
USNORTHCOM’s past performance of integrating DoD capabilities with civil 
authorities during domestic events.  However, as the new commander, he felt or “sensed” 
that he was not able to get accurate information in a timely manner to make informed 
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decisions quickly during times of emergencies.  Therefore, his decision to immediately 
establish a working group to develop a feasible program that would “satisfy his desire for 
direct information on the states.”    
By allowing the data in the story to develop the framework, it seems that upon 
taking command, Admiral Winnefeld was in the central domain of disorder.  He 
established a working group of experts who looked at a few courses of action— attributes 
of the complicated domain.  However, this group consisted of individuals from a cross 
section of the command, which the recommended that the duties and responsibilities of 
the new office should emerge during the implementation phase.  These are attributes that 
reside in the complex domain.  However, his decision to utilize the “Country Desk 
Officer” concept was straight out of the simple domain.  Snowden states, 
Individuals compete to interpret the central space on the basis of their 
preference for action.  Those most comfortable with stable order seek to 
create or enforce rules…..The stronger the importance of the issue, the 
more people seem to pull it toward the domain where they most 
empowered by their perspectives.   
Snowden goes on to explain: 
Problems in the simple complex are in an ordered system.  There is a 
relationship between cause and effect and it is predictable, so it can be 
determined in advance.  The decision model is sense, categorize, and 
respond.  We see what is coming-in, we make it fit a previous determined 
category, and we decide what to do.  It is a model based on best practices 
such as standard operation procedures or bureaucratic procedures. 
(Snowden, 2003)   
In the case of the regional desk officer concept, Admiral Winnefeld had already 
made the decision to utilize “state desk officers” based on the practice of other military 
organizations using “country desk officers.”  He basically sensed there was an 
information flow and sharing problem, determined that the problem fell into the same 
category as other military organizations dealing with individual countries, and 
determined the solution was the same “country desk officer” procedures of other military 
organizations.  
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Unfortunately, when leaders use best practice in a complicated or complex 
domain, trouble can occur.  As Snowden states, “you end up pissing people off.” 
(Snowden D., 2009).  Tim Harford, who is a columnist for the Financial Times, has 
defined this problem as the “God Complex.”  This occurs when leaders in the face of an 
incredibly complicated world are nevertheless absolutely convinced that they understand 
the way the world works.  Therefore, no matter how complicated the problem, the leader 
is absolutely sure that his/her solution is the correct one.  However as Harford states, 
“with billions of people, the world is far too complex to think in those terms” (Harford, 
2011).    
3. Building the Regional Desk Office 
I joined the regional desk office at the end of November 2010.  However, I soon 
discovered that the office was just coming together, and no one was sure what our 
mission, duties, and/or responsibilities were as regional desk officers.  Therefore, I did 
not receive a clear mission statement or defined requirements.  The only guidance we all 
received from the office director was to travel throughout our assigned regions and build 
relationships with state and federal emergency preparedness personnel.  As my new boss 
stated, “We are building the plane as we are flying it.”  In hindsight, this metaphor war 
right on target.  The lack of a clear mission and ambiguous requirements led to months of 
confusion among the regional desk officers, across the USNORTHCOM staff and the 
defense coordinating officers, as well as our state and federal partners.  It also created 
animosity between the DCOs and our new office because they thought it was the role of  
the DCO to communicate between the states and the commander, USNORTHCOM.  It 
seemed to the DCOs that we were sent out by the parent organization to watch over their 
shoulders and even do their jobs for them. 
This is an example of what Snowden refers to as the boundary between the simple 
domain and the chaotic domain.  He refers to this boundary as the “zone of 
complacency.”  This is when decision makers start to believe that things are simple and 
ordered, and that past success means that you cannot fail (Snowden and Boone, 2007).  In 
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this case, it refers to the past success of the country desk officer program.  Unfortunately, 
before you realize it, you fall off the cliff from the simple domain into the chaotic 
domain, which puts the organization into a crisis.  
Snowden explains that the chaotic context is the “domain of rapid response.”  In a 
chaotic context, searching for the right answers would be pointless:  The relationship 
between cause and effect are impossible to determine because they shift constantly and 
no manageable patterns exist—only turbulence.   In this domain, a leader must first act to 
establish order, then sense where stability is present and where it is absent, then respond 
by working to transform the situation from chaos into complexity, where the 
identification of emerging patterns can both help prevent future crises and discern new 
opportunities (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
This is exactly what the director for the region desk office did.  He sensed he 
needed to do something to relieve the pressure on the RDO Office from organizations 
both within USNORTHCOM and externally in the regions.  Therefore, he acted by 
directing all the regional desk officers including himself into the field to act, sense, and 
respond through the crisis.  No one was sure what the duties and responsibilities of the 
new office were, but he was receiving pressure from the commander, deputy commander, 
ARNORTH, and the USNORTHCOM staff to do something in order to prove the 
concept.  In addition, the DCOs, and our federal and state partners were asking what our 
purpose was.  The traveling gave the impression that the new office was doing 
something, and what we got out of it was a sense of what the mission should be and the 
role the office should have in USNORTHCOM. 
4. Refining the RDO Program 
By January, the regional desk office made its first attempt at defining a mission 
statement in preparation for briefing the commander on the operations of the new 
program.  The mission statement and briefing were sent out to the defense coordinating 
officers throughout the country who objected to the mission statement:  
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The RDO Mission is to provide the Commander greater situational 
awareness and improve USNORTHCOM’s speed of response to FEMA 
regions and interagency mission partners, when requested. 
The reason for their objection was that it cut them out of information flow process 
between the commander of USNORTHCOM and the FEMA regions.  They strongly 
believed that the defense coordinating officers who were co-located with the FEMA 
regional offices should remain the single point of contact for DoD to ensure that the 
relationships that were formed over the years were not suddenly changed during times of 
crisis.  It was important to make sure that the message to the commander was accurate 
and consistent in order to make sure the correct capabilities were delivered when 
requested by FEMA.   
Therefore, by February, a new mission statement was developed and presented to 
the commander during a briefing with the regional desk officers.  The new mission 
statement included utilizing the defense coordinating officers and element.  It stated: 
The RDO Mission is to provide the Commander greater situational 
awareness and improve USNORTHCOM’s speed of response to FEMA 
regions and interagency mission partners, through the DCO/DCE, when 
requested. 
The Commander provided his feedback and guidance for the program.  He re-
stated that he expected to have an action officer assigned to each FEMA Region that 
would be subject matter experts on each region, including the critical infrastructure and 
capabilities that were in each region.  He expected that each regional desk officer would 
develop relationships with the emergency management personnel of each state including 
the National Guard.  He wanted action officers who had a complete understanding of 
each state and could increase his situational awareness of events occurring in any state, so 
that USNORTHCOM could lean forward and increase the speed of its response.  He also 
stated that each regional desk officer would become familiar with state emergency 
preparedness and response plans and assist the states in developing their plans by 
communicating the USNORTHCOM perspective to them.   
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The director of the regional desk office held a planning meeting following the 
briefing to the commander to discuss the way ahead for the program.  He believed that 
the work that we had been performing was on track with the commander’s intent, but we 
needed to clarify our duties and responsibilities, as well as our position within the 
USNORTHCOM staff.  He realized that we were a new organization and the creation of 
the program was considered a “big threat” to organizations such as ARNORTH.  
ARNORTH had the administrative responsibility for the DCO program and they were not 
comfortable with the DCOs ability to go directly to the command by utilizing the regional 
desk office.    
The final mission statement that was developed in coordination with ARNORTH, 
the DCOs, and the Interagency Coordination Directorate, and published in the 
NORTHCOM Instruction stated: 
The RDO Mission is to develop knowledge and networks required to 
provide the Commander greater situational awareness and improve 
USNORTHCOM’s speed of response to the FEMA Regions and 
interagency mission partners, through the Defense Coordinating Officers 
and Defense Coordination Elements, when requested.  Additionally, 
support States and regions in developing their plans by providing the HQ 
USNORTHCOM perspective.  
As pointed out in the story, there was a lot of activity during the refinement phase 
because the regional desk officer program has moved into what Snowden refers to as the 
complex context.  This is the domain of emergence and the realm of “unknown 
unknowns” where the whole is far more than the sum of its parts.  There is no right 
answer that can be ferreted out.  It this domain, the situations and decisions in 
organizations are complex because of some major change that introduces unpredictability 
and flux.  In this domain, things can only be understood in retrospect.  Instructive 
patterns, however, can emerge if the leader conducts experiments that are safe to fail.  
That is why the leader must patiently allow the path forward to reveal itself.  The leader 
needs to probe first, then sense, and then respond.  The one concern is the temptation for 
the leader to fall back into traditional command-and-control management style and to 
demand fail-safe business plans with defined outcomes (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
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Once again, the data that can be pulled from the story illustrates Snowden’s points 
about the complex context and domain.  The director of the RDO Office was able to 
move the program from the chaotic domain when he “sensed” enough action had 
occurred and sufficient information had been collected in the field.  It was at this point 
that he began to formulate the first mission statement for the program office with input 
from each of the regional desk officers.  The mission was then sent out to the DCO to get 
their feedback.  Unfortunately, the mission statement missed the mark, and the mission 
statement was revised for the commander’s review.  
Again, the mission statement was not on target, but got closer.  At this time, the 
commander provided his guidance and more information.  The mission statement was 
sent to several offices within USNORTHCOM to get their feedback, which was 
incorporated.  In this case, the RDO director went through what Tim Harford refers to as 
the process of trial and error. Harford states, “Show me a successful complex system and 
I will show you a system that has evolved through trial and error” (Harford, 2011).  The 
process of refining the mission statement was trial and error or probing and refining.  As 
Henry Ford once said, “Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again more 
intelligently.”  To his credit, the director of the RDO did not fall back on his traditional 
experience of command-and-control management for which the military is known.  
Instead, he created an atmosphere where it was safe to fail and try again until the mission 
was refined. 
The director of the RDO did not stop with refining the mission statement.  He also 
believed that, due to the lack of clearly defined program requirements, we needed to 
integrate action officers into other office’s processes for steady state and crisis 
operations.  We needed to develop partnerships and relationships throughout the staff to 
ensure we had access to the most current information about the regions and states.  He 
initiated two courses of action to get the ball moving.  The first was to get permission to 
use a contract that consisted of “Information Exchange Brokers.”  This contract was a 
pre-existing contract vehicle that USNORTHCOM utilized to analyze how information 
was shared among the staff.  It was their job to assist the regional desk office to integrate 
smoothly and effectively into the existing processes of the staff.  The second course of 
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action included assigning me the task of developing the USNORTHCOM Instruction that 
would clearly define the mission, organization, and responsibilities of the regional desk 
officer program for the staff to understand.  
A USNORTHCOM Instruction is an internal directive that explains the purpose 
of USNORTHCOM programs.  The USNORTHCOM Instruction for the regional desk 
office documented the functions of a regional desk officer, which were developed in 
coordination with the Defense Coordinating Officers, Army North, and the Interagency 
Coordination Directorate.  These functions include: 
1. Serves as an advisor to the Commander, USNORTHCOM on 
regional and state capabilities and plans in order to anticipate requests for 
DoD support. 
2. Provides the CDR greater situational awareness on FEMA regions 
and states by enhancing information sharing through the DCO/E to the 
FEMA Regional Headquarters, interagency mission partners, Non-
Government Organizations (NGO), and public private partnerships. 
3. Facilitates information exchange between the Commander and the 
DCOs. 
4. Coordinates with DCO/Es to provide USNORTHCOM perspective 
on DSCA plans to state and regional partners. 
5. Coordinates across the USNORTHCOM staffs, external agencies, 
Interagency, Liaison Officers, and the following Special Staffs:  Interagency 
Coordination Directorate, NORTHCOM National Guard Integration Office, 
and Public Affairs to improve situational awareness during steady state 
operations, exercises, planning, and logistical conferences, and to crisis 
operations. 
6. Serves as the primary point of contact of entry for the DCOs to 
exchange information across the NORAD and USNORTHCOM staffs as 
needed. 
The refinement phase of the program is an on-going process that allows the 
organization to grow and adapt.  In this case, Snowden refers the complicated context or 
the domain of experts.  In this domain, there are several ways of doing things, all of 
which are legitimate if you have the expertise.  Therefore, you must analyze the choices 
or call in experts who can make the right decision (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
This is what the director of the RDO did once he got a sense for direction of the 
program.  He received permission to use a group of experts who were on contract to 
USNORTHCOM.  These “Information Exchange Brokers” consisted of several retired 
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senior colonels who had worked in key positions throughout USNORTHCOM prior to 
their retirement.  One was even the former ARNORTH liaison officer to 
USNORTHCOM.  They had a thorough understand of both USNORTHCOM and 
ARNORTH, had professional connections throughout both organizations, and a firm 
understanding of the operations of both USNORTHCOM and ARNORTH.   
As for the USNORTHCOM Instruction for the regional desk officer program, it 
outlined several functions that represent several possible ways regional desk officers can 
accomplish their mission—each of which are legitimate depending on the situation and 
circumstance.  It gave the program the flexibility to adapt and provide the commander 
with the information he originally desired about the states. 
C. THE HERO’S JOURNEY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
FRAMEWORK (BELLAVITA, 1991)   
1. Background 
The first half of this chapter reviewed the decision-making process that 
developed, implemented, and refined the regional desk officer program at 
USNORTHCOM.  However, there is more to the story. We must also examine the RDO 
program from the individual point of view.  The development of the regional desk officer 
program from the beginning was a team approach.  It took multiple organizations and 
individuals working together, and at times arguing with each other, to provide the 
ingredients, friction and heat to mold the commander’s concept into an operational 
program that could make a difference.    
The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick good men to 
do what he wants done, and self-restraint to keep from meddling with 
them while they do it. —Theodore Roosevelt 
The commander of USNORTHCOM did just that. He picked a team of experts 
from across the command to bring his vision into a concept that could be resourced.  The 
concept was then handed off to another group of individuals that again represented a 
cross section of the command with their own unique and varying experiences and 
expertise.  This group of individuals forged a team of regional desk officers that allowed 
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a path for the program to emerge through sensing as well as trial and error.  As the story 
reveals, this was a challenging process in which many people and organizations had 
input.   
This story may be about the regional desk officer program, but it is actually 
describing a complex adaptive system (CAS).  A CAS is  
comprised of agents, individuals as well as groups of individuals, who 
“resonate” through sharing common interests, knowledge and/or goals due 
to their history of interaction and sharing worldviews.  Agents respond to 
both external pressures (from environment or other agents, e.g,. leaders) 
and internal pressures that are generated as the agents struggle with 
interdependency and resulting conflicting constraints. These tensions 
when spread across a network of interactive and interdependent agents, 
generate system-wide emergent learnings, capabilities, innovations, and 
adaptability.  Importantly, such elaborations are products of interactions 
among agents, rather than being “caused” by the specific acts of 
individuals described as leaders. (Lictenstein, Uhl-Bien, Seers, Orton, & 
Scheiber, 2006) 
A central theme emerges in the literature on CAS and in the RDO story itself.  It 
is the importance of relationships.  As stated by Sibthorpe, Glasgow and Longstaff,  
“CAS are agents connected to and exchange information with others in the system 
through a complex web of relationships” (Beverly Sibthorpe, 2004).  According to the 
complexity leadership theory, “leadership is an emergent event, an outcome of relational 
interactions among agents”  (Lictenstein, Uhl-Bien, Seers, Orton, & Scheiber, 2006).   
As for the story, the commander’s own expectations were “that each regional desk 
officer developed relationships with emergency management personnel.”  This notion 
was also reiterated by the director of the RDO when he provided the guidance to travel to 
our assigned regions and build relationships with federal and state emergency 
preparedness personnel. 
In order to study the importance of relationship building in the development of the 
RDO program, the author will continue with the RDO story from a personal individual 




to provide examples to the reader on how relationships were formed and used to define 
and refine my role as a regional desk officer, as well as advance the position of the 
program within USNORTHCOM. 
However, in order to analyze the data that is weaved throughout story, the author 
utilizes a second framework in which to examine and analyze the data.  This time the 
author has chosen a framework model known as the “hero’s journey,” originally 
developed by Joseph Campbell (Campbell, 1968), but later modified and adapted by 
Chris Bellavita, who referred to it as “the hero’s journey in public administration” 
(Bellavita, 1991).  While studying the successful and positive work experiences of some 
public administrators, Bellavita discovered that their stories were structurally similar to 
Joseph Campbell’s “hero’s journey.”   
I designed the questionnaire to elicit data about the organizational nature 
of individual experience.  What emerged instead were stories about people 
overcoming forces to bring new vitality to stagnant systems. —Chris 
Bellavita    
According to Bellavita, 
The hero gets the call to adventure…., the second stage is the ordeal.  The 
hero enters the threshold of the journey and has one last chance to say no 
to it.  The ordeal involves planning, organizing, and implementing a 
specific vision of the future.  During the ordeal, the hero encounters 
helpers and enemies.  The third stage of the journey is the hero’s return.  
The hero…..is a changed person, and some part of the hero’s world is 
transformed. (See Table 1) (Bellavita, 1991) 
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Table 1.   The Hero’s Journey in Public Administration 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Call to Adventure 
     Duty 
     Opportunity 
     Drive 
The Ordeal 
     At the threshold 
     Elements of the ordeal 
     Allies 
     Enemies 
The Return 
     Rewards 
     Transformation of the hero 
     Transformation of status quo 
     Transformation of the world 
 
 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I, I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. — Robert Frost 
This is the story of my experience as a regional desk officer for USNORTHCOM, 
from the time I was notified of my selection in November 2010, until I received my 
orders transferring out in July 2011.  The first thing the reader should understand is that I 
did not apply for the position.  In fact, I had never heard of the regional desk officer 
program at USNORTHCOM, even though I had worked there since March 2009.  Little 
did I know that I was just beginning a journey that would teach me not only about the 
program, but about the complex interconnected world on interagency collaboration and 
the web of relationships that are created to ensure the nation is prepared to respond to the 
next man-made or natural disaster.   
The purpose of the story is not only to document the journey, but also to analyze 
it.  Like most journeys, trials and tribulations along the path can be examined so that 
lessons may be drawn for others to use.  Harold McAlindon, a successful business leader 
in his own right, once said, “Do not follow where the path may lead.  Go instead where 
there is no path and leave a trail.”  So, it is with this story that I hope to leave a trail for 
the readers to follow, to effect changes in their own organizations as they face an 
increasingly complex world.      
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2. Call to Adventure 
I was notified of my possible selection to this new job via angry emails and 
voicemail messages left by people in my current office at USNORTHCOM.  I was 
assigned to the Strategic Plans Directorate (J5) as the Director for the Pandemic Influenza 
and Infectious Disease Program, but was attending school at the time.  The messages 
were fairly consistent in tone and wording.  They all wanted to know why I had applied 
to be an action officer in the newly formed regional desk office.  Apparently, my chain of 
command had been told to release me from my current duties and transfer me to the new 
regional desk office.  I explained to my chain of command that I did not apply for the 
position and was just as confused as they were about the situation.  Once I explained this 
to my chain of command, they pushed back on releasing me.  Unfortunately, it was the 
deputy commander of USNORTHCOM who had requested my transfer to the new office, 
and so it was a done deal. 
The surprises did not stop there.  When I reported to my new boss, it was obvious 
he did not share the deputy commander’s vision of me working as a regional desk officer.  
I believe the conversations went something like:  
Let me explain something to you.  All those people out there applied to be 
regional desk officers and went through a selection process, but I guess 
you don’t have to because you are special.  The Deputy Commander said 
you are the right person for this job, so now you’re here.  However I 
allowed everyone else to give me input about the region they would prefer 
to work, but for you I am going to tell you which region you will get.   
My thoughts immediately went to “here we go again.”  This is exactly how my last job 
started! 
Bellavita states that there are three main reasons why people heed the call to 
adventure: duty, opportunity, and the drive to accomplish something (Bellavita, 1991).  In 
my case, it was most definitely a call to duty from the deputy commander of 
USNORTHCOM.  However, this does not imply that my heart was not in the job; it 
simply means that I did not know what I did not know about this new position.  In fact,  I 
did have experience with the FEMA regions from my previous job as director for the 
USNORTHCOM Pandemic and Infectious disease program.  Therefore, I saw this new 
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position as an opportunity to work directly with the FEMA regions and possibly make a 
positive difference in how USNORTHCOM integrated with its federal and state partners.    
3. Threshold of the Journey 
I was at the threshold of my journey when I found myself flying to Washington, 
DC, to attend a FEMA conference on my first day in my new job.  It was a small regional 
jet and, as luck would have it, the deputy commander was on the flight.  As we were 
getting off the plane, I politely thanked him for this new opportunity to succeed.  He 
smiled and asked if he got me on this one?  I explained that he had—in more ways than 
one.  At which point, he replied that I did not have to accept the position.  However, he 
knew that I had worked on several new programs over the years because I wanted to 
make a difference.  Therefore, I accepted the new challenge.  He then explained his 
reasoning for selecting me—one of the new regional desk officers.  He said  
Who better than a national guardsman who is actually from one of the 
states in his assigned region?  You know the people in the National Guard 
throughout your region, you were a civil support planner, you have 
worked with states and the interagency in both a military and civilian 
capacity, and you know how to work at the edges to build relationships 
and accomplish the mission.”   
At which point, I explained to him that I was not assigned to that particular 
region.  His reply was that he would see about that.  That led to another interesting 
conversation with my new boss, who was also attending the conference. 
At this point, it is important to examine the difference between my interactions 
with the deputy commander verses the director of the RDO.   The difference is that I had 
a relationship with the deputy commander and not my new boss. Therefore, the reader 
needs to understand the definition of a relationship and the context that is used in the 
story.  Margaret Wheatley states  
In the quantum world, relationships are not just interesting: to many 
physicists, they are all there is to reality.  None of us exists independent of 
our relationships with others and with relationships we give up 
predictability and open up to potentials. (Wheatley, 1999)   
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Michael Fullan believes that relationships are what causes an enterprise to be 
successful, because it is the relationships that make the difference (Fullan, 2001).   Lewin 
and Regine, make the case that  
There is a new style of leadership in successful companies, one that 
focuses on people and relationships as essential to getting sustained results 
because it requires a genuine connection with co-workers; you can’t fake 
it and expect to get results. (Regine & Lewin, 2000)  
The regional desk office reported directly to the deputy commander of 
USNORTHCOM, so he had a vested interest in its success and therefore selected me to 
be in the new office.  He had seen me work in different capacities over the last seven 
years on some very complex and sensitive issues.  Therefore, he had a preconception that 
I could help get the new program to meet its full potential.  As for me, the decision to 
take the journey was made easier knowing that he had a genuine connection with me, one 
that was built over the last seven years. 
Bellavita explains that, before the ordeal can begin, the public administrator is 
faced with six possible “good” reasons that will prevent the hero from completing the 
journey (Bellavita, 1991).  They include: 
1.  No Credentials 
2.  Prohibitive rules 
3.  Political Barriers 
4.  No Money 
5.  History is opposed 
6.  Risk of failure 
In my case, I was confronted with a combination of reasons not to pass over the 
threshold including: 
1. No Credentials:  The regional desk officer program was a new concept that was 
unproved, and people were not sure of that the program was needed. 
2. Prohibitive Rules:  There is an agreement between USNORTHCOM and the 
National Guard Bureau that USNORTHCOM will not communicate directly with 
National Guard of each state without prior coordination with NGB.  Therefore, the 
mandate to coordinate with the states would prove difficult. 
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3. Political Barriers:  As stated in Chapter III, there are many organizations 
throughout USNORTHCOM that believed they have the mission to perform coordination 
and share information with the interagency as well as to brief the commander during 
domestic events. 
4. History is opposed:  The defense coordinating officers have been recognized 
and accepted as the single DoD point of contact with FEMA.  They also have State 
Emergency Management Liaison Officers that train and plan with the states. 
4. The Ordeal 
Bellavita explains: 
Once passed the threshold, the ordeal begins.  Each journey is unique 
because what the hero must do to be successful is specific to the situation.  
But the structure of the ordeal can be outlined.  It involves a vision of what 
is to be accomplished; planning, organizing, and implementing actions to 
achieve the vision; and having faith and courage to believe that the 
adventure will succeed.  The journey is an ordeal because it tests the 
hero’s ability to accomplish something beyond the normal range of 
experience and achievement. (Bellavita, 1991) 
My journey was certainly unique and the process of being hand selected for 
assignments is not especially helpful when it comes to earning people’s trust.  Everyone 
in the new office was friendly enough with me, but there were always little digs about me 
having a special relationship with the front office.  However, I was slowly accepted as 
time went on—to the point that we began having social lunches on Fridays to build team 
spirit and camaraderie within the office.  It was during one of these lunches that one of 
the action officers who was in the Air Force actually said, “Don’t take this wrong because 
it is meant to be a compliment.  As an Army officer, you are more Air Force than most 
Air Force officers I know.”  The comment was quickly followed by another who joked, 
“That’s because he is a civilian in an Army uniform.”  This is an example of what Linden 
refers to “as making time for relationships and trust.”   
These lunches gave us the time in an informal setting to discuss issues and make 
decisions, while providing the time to form relationships (Linden, 2002).  Rosenbuam 
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also calls this building social cohesion, where members enjoy working together and are 
committed to making the partnership a success (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
On another occasion, the office director pulled me aside to apologize.  As he said 
“it turns out the General was correct, you were the right guy for the job because you work 
hard, I can depend on you, and you get the job done right.”  This is an example of 
building trust through character and competence (Covey, 2006).   
As for working with the regions, the lack of clearly defined mission requirements 
also created animosity between the defense coordinating officers and our new office.  
During my initial visit to the region in December with the defense coordinating officer 
and the defense coordinating element, which is his full time staff, it became evident that 
they did not understand the need for a regional desk officer.  Everyone in the office was 
friendly with me during the initial meetings, but they were guarded.  Most discussions 
between staff members occurred behind closed doors.  During my initial office call with 
the DCO, he explained his expectations of me.  He stated that they had no problem 
working with me because that is what the NORTHCOM commander directed and 
“whatever the Four Star wants, the Four Star gets and we will make you look good.”  
However, I needed to keep him informed of all my visits, meetings, and office calls that I 
planned to attend in the region.   
The office is collocated with the FEMA Regional Headquarters and, during the 
visit, I was given a tour and introduced to the FEMA personnel.  It was obvious that the 
relationship between the DCO staff and the FEMA staff was well established.  Everyone 
agreed that being collocated was conducive to sharing information and working as a 
team.  It was also evident that the FEMA personnel were also confused and concerned 
about the regional desk officer program.  The regional administrator stated that she had 
formed a good relationship with the DCO and she was going to continue to utilize him 
and his staff as the single point of contact for DoD.  She and her staff had no objection to 
a regional desk officer visiting, but that I should communicate through the DCO.   
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I also received guidance from the commander of Army North (ARNORTH) 
during his visit to the FEMA regional office.  He wanted to ensure that I clearly 
understood the following points. 
1. That he had day-to-day administrative responsibly for all the DCO/DCE 
staff throughout the country.  However, the DCOs worked directly for the commander of 
NORTHCOM during a domestic crisis. 
2. Relationships with our federal and state partners are extremely important, 
and the DCO had done an outstanding job cultivating these relationships for several 
years. 
3. To avoid confusion with our federal and state  partners, the DCO should 
be the single point of contact for DoD throughout the region, and I should work through 
him to communicate with people in the region. 
By February, I was assigned the task to develop the USNORTHCOM instruction 
for the regional desk office, which formally documents the organization, duties, 
responsibilities, and functions of the regional desk officer program.  Once the document 
is signed by the commander, it gives the regional desk office its authorities to carry out 
its assigned mission and tasks.   
5. The Hero’s Friends 
I took this opportunity to work with other offices throughout the command to get 
their input and buy-in in the development of the mission statement, duties, 
responsibilities, and functions of the regional desk office.  I also included the DCO and 
ARNORTH in the development and review phases of the document.  In essence, the 
USNORTHCOM Instruction for the regional desk office was a collaborative effort and 
was developed in coordination with the Defense Coordinating Officers, ARNORTH, and 
the Interagency Coordination Directorate.  This allowed me to develop relationships 
across the command and with my DCO/DCE in the field.  They all felt that they had a 
voice in the process and appreciated the chance to contribute.  This is an example of the 
steps Linden explains that assist in building a collaborative effort that can develop into 
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successful partnerships. “Build trust by giving parties a chance to be accountable, listen 
carefully to the other parties, acknowledging the other organization’s point of view” 
(Linden, 2002). 
These relationships played a key role along my journey, because they became 
what Bellavita refers to as the “hero’s friends” (Bellavita, 1991).  I relied on my fellow 
regional desk officers, the DCO and DCE, as well as the people I worked with across the 
command to help move the RDO program ahead.  Without their help, guidance, 
feedback, and cooperation, I would not have been able to get the instruction finalized and 
approved.  I also would not have been able to get the information about my region in 
order to perform my job and develop the partnerships that the commander directed 
through his vision. 
6. The Hero’s Enemies 
Unfortunately, the confusion across the USNORTHCOM staff about the proper 
role of the regional desk office continued.  The regional desk office is responsible to 
provide advice to the commander and/or deputy commander on regional and state 
capabilities during a crisis.  The regional desk officer is also responsible to facilitate the 
flow of information from the region (DCO) to the commander during a crisis, increase his 
situational awareness, and inform him for rapid decision making.  This was not well 
received throughout the command because several organizations already believed it was 
their mission to carry out and not the regional desk office.  In fact, there were many 
throughout the command that thought the RDO concept would not last.  This is what 
Bellavita refers to as the hero’s enemies.  According to Bellavita, the hero will also 
encounter forces that do not want the journey to succeed.  He states, “The pathologies of 
bureaucracy can be the most pervasive enemy” (Bellavita, 1991).  
Two incidents illustrated the difficulties confronted by the regional desk office in 
performing their responsibilities.  The first occurred during a meeting on March 9, 2011, 
in the Deputy Commander’s Office of USNORTHCOM.  The purpose of the meeting 
was to get a situational update on the flooding that was occurring throughout the  
 
 52 
Mid-Atlantic area.  The meeting included senior representatives of the Interagency 
Coordination Directorate and the Operations Directorate, with me representing the 
regional desk office.   
In the hallway, prior to the meeting, the representatives of both organizations 
were objecting to a regional desk officer attending the meeting.  They all stated that there 
was no need for the regional desk officer program because their staffs had complete 
situational awareness.  However, during the meeting, they had no information about the 
situation from the state level.  As the RDO who was supposed to be the SME, I briefed 
the group on the current situations in the affected states.  I was immediately chastised by 
both directorates for talking directly to my contacts in the states, and the information and 
the situation was utilized as an example of why there should not be an RDO program. 
The second incident took place during the National Level Exercise in April 2011.  
Prior to the exercise, the Operations Directorate (J-3) presented an argument that the 
RDO program should report to their directorate and not directly to the commander and 
deputy commander.  Therefore, at the request of the J-3 director, the RDOs were required 
to work in the Future Operation Center of the J-3 during the exercise in order to provide 
input into their planning efforts.  Unfortunately, the RDO desk officers became isolated 
due to their location in the Future Operations Cell, and were prevented from maintaining 
situational awareness and connectivity with their regions. 
These two incidents are examples of specific enemies of the hero.  The first one is 
referred to as “Warlords.”  Bellavita defines them as people whose territory, resources, or 
other interests are threatened by the hero’s action (Bellavita, 1991).  As was the case in 
the deputy commander’s office, the leaders representing those two directorates felt that it 
was their job or territory to brief the deputy commander—not the job of a regional desk 
officer.  The second is referred to as “The Anxious.”  Bellavita explains that the hero 
must overcome other people’s fear of the new and untested.  In this case, the operations 
directorate attempted to have the RDO report to them.  This in effect would allow them to 
control and direct an organization that they were trying to understand.  
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7. Vision, Planning, Organizing, and Implementing 
Through the process of developing the USNORTHCOM Instruction for the 
regional desk officer program, the vision of developing a partnership with the DCO and 
his team became clear.  Therefore, my plan was to work closely with them and visit in 
person whenever possible.  The best way of organizing that was to determine what events 
and meetings in the region were important opportunities to work on relationship and trust 
building.  I then proceeded to work with the DCO’s staff to make sure I was able to 
attend those key events and meetings throughout the region with them.     
During the following months of March, April, and May, I was able to attend 
multiple events with the defense coordinating officer and/or his team at both the regional 
and state levels.  This gave me the chance to observe how they went about building 
relationships and maintaining partnerships with federal and state agencies.  One thing that 
stood out in each of these visits is that the defense-coordinating officer had built a solid 
team of people who worked well together.  However, he did not have a direct supervisory 
position over most of the people; he simply provided the informal leaderships that 
enabled them to work together and integrate their efforts as if they were formal 
organization.  In fact, most positions on this informal team consist of people of the same 
rank as the defense-coordinating officer. 
This point of teamwork and camaraderie was driven home to me during the 
regional hurricane conference that the DCO hosted in May.  Every member of the team, 
to include the regional, state, and joint medical emergency preparedness officers, was 
present and fully participated.  The entire team voluntarily stayed at the same hotel and 
socialized together in the evenings.  When I inquired about how this team of teams 
became so cohesive, several people gave credit to the DCO for ensuring that everyone 
remained trained, informed, and empowered to perform their jobs.  As two people stated, 
You know that he always has your back because he trusts you to do your 
job and he supports your decisions.  That means we do not have to worry 
about someone second-guessing and looking over our shoulders.  We can 
just concentrate on getting the job done right and making a difference. 
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Another person stated,  
The DCO puts a lot of energy on the front end of the process.  He makes 
himself part of the interview process to ensure he gets the right person for 
the job.  Then he makes sure you receive the proper training, guidance, 
and information to correctly perform you job.  At which point, he gets out 
of the way and places trust and confidence in you to do your job without 
micro-managing you to death. 
I was able to observe this for myself when I attended a drill weekend with the 
regional emergency preparedness liaison team, hosted by one of the state emergency 
preparedness liaison teams (SEPLO).  The SEPLO team provided site tours and 
facilitated meetings with the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Guard State Joint 
Forces Headquarters and Joint Operations Center, and with the State Emergency 
Management Agency and Emergency Operations Center.  It was obvious that the SEPLO 
team had developed a working relationship with all three agencies.  Everyone was on a 
first name basis and joked with each other easily.  As one emergency management 
personnel stated,  
These guys are part of the team and we are constantly sharing information 
and talking with each other.  When a crisis occurs in the state, they have 
these seats already assigned to them and we work side by side to get 
through the crisis.  It really is the only way to have a truly integrated 
approach to emergency response.    
As for the DCO, he was unique in that he has been in the position since it was 
created in 2006.   In that time he has also created partnerships and relationships 
throughout the region; it is obvious that federal and state agencies trust and value his 
opinion.  Although I was never given the opportunity to attend, he had a weekly one-on-
one meeting with the FEMA regional administrator to maintain information sharing 
between FEMA and DoD within the region.  The DCO also ensures that either he or one 
of his planners attends the quarterly regional interagency steering committee meeting 
(RISC).  The members of the RISC represent the agencies that would respond to a major 
disaster under the Federal Response Plan. FEMA holds meetings with this group 
quarterly to discuss initiatives and advances that relate to their disaster response 
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capabilities. It also provides an opportunity for FEMA officials to advise the group on 
developments within FEMA that bear on the response situation. 
At the state level, the DCO and his team were well engaged with State Emergency 
Management Agencies and the National Guard.  The SEPLOs attend training on the 
weekends with the Joint Force Headquarters of each state to ensure there is integration 
during times of crisis.  SEPLO’s have assigned seats in both the National Guard Joint 
Operations Centers and the State Emergency Operations Centers for exercises and 
operations during an incident.  The DCO and his team were also invited to several 
National Guard conferences during this period to include the initial regional homeland 
security response force (HRF) conference that was hosted by one of the states and 
attended by the National Guard Bureau, FEMA, the state emergency management 
agency, and National Guard representatives from each of the states in the region.  The 
DCO attended with several members of the DCE, regional and state emergency 
preparedness liaison teams.  
The DCOs input was sought out by the state and NGB, and was well received.  
Other states also sought out the DCO’s expertise, experience and participation in their 
emergency preparedness conferences held at the state level.  After speaking with 
representatives from both states, it was clear that a strong relationship had developed with 
the DCO and his team, which was seen as mutually beneficial to ensure that the region 
has a comprehensive and integrated approach to emergency preparedness.  One state 
official stated, “I wouldn’t think of not including the DCO in these conferences.  He is an 
experienced leader who knows how to get the job done right and understands what the 
states need.” 
8. Transformation and Return to the Kingdom 
The amazing thing about the journey is that by developing a relationship built on 
trust with the DCO and his staff, I learned how to form partnerships from watching how 
he conducted himself.  Through this process, I was able to develop the partnerships with 
USNORTHCOM’s federal and state partners and succeed in meeting the commander’s 
expectations.  By the end of the Journey, I had people throughout the region that I could 
 56 
call to get the information the commander required.  This in turn could allow 
USNORTHCOM to “lean forward” and prepare to respond to a domestic incident before 
the request is received.     
On a final note, as the end of my tour nears, I also find myself a member of the 
DCO’s regional team.  Perhaps there is validity to my observations as I seem to agree 
with the person who stated, “the DCO puts a lot of energy on the front end…. He makes 
sure you receive the proper training, guidance, and information to correctly perform your 
job.”  As I write this story, and look back over the eight months, I realize that is what he 
did with me.  Once he felt comfortable and was assured that I understood how to operate 
in this complex environment, he cut me loose to travel throughout the region.  Before I 
realized it, I was part of the informal email chains of invitation to stay at the same hotels, 
attend dinners, and, more importantly, received the information directly from sources that 
gave me the situational awareness the commander expected me to have.  Somewhere 
along this eight-month journey, I was accepted as part of the team.  As the DCO said at 
the regional conference, I finally have someone from USNORTHCOM trained and now 
he decides to get out.  Maybe I will find a reserve position as emergency preparedness 
liaison officer working in the region.     
This chapter provided examples of how a bureaucratic organization such as 
USNORTHCOM can use the activities of leading and the elements of partnerships to 
move national preparedness to a higher level of fitness.  Through the use of these tools, 
the nation can successfully developed the engaged partnerships that the National 
Response Framework requires to bring the nation’s resources to bear on any man-made 
or natural disaster in a coordinated and collaborative effort.      
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A.  FINDINGS 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine how USNORTHCOM could improve 
its ability to integrate military capabilities quickly and effectively to support civil 
authorities during domestic incidents in accordance with the NRF.  In order to address 
this problem, the author developed the following research hypothesis, as stated in Chapter 
I.   
In order for USNORTHCOM to improve its ability to integrate military 
capabilities in accordance with the NRF, it needs to use the activities of 
leading combined with the elements of partnerships to improve its ability 
to cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate with other organizations.   
This hypothesis was tested by answering three research questions throughout this 
thesis, which included a combination of a literature review and analyses of the 
mechanisms that USNORTHCOM has used to coordinate with its federal and state 
partners for domestic events. 
The three research questions consisted of two secondary questions and a primary 
question: 
1. What mechanisms and programs does USNORTHCOM use to improve 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration with its federal and state partners for 
emergency preparedness and response?   
This secondary question was addressed in Chapter III, which reviewed these 
mechanisms and programs.  The chapter also pointed out that these multiple 
organizations are stove-piped with overlapping interests and/or equities that can 
overwhelm USNORTHCOM’s partners.  Unfortunately, as the literature points out, even 
with these multiple programs, USNORTHCOM has had difficulties integrating military 
capabilities with civil authorities during domestic events.  Therefore, the commander of 
USNORTHCOM developed the regional desk officer program to get information quickly 
and directly from a group of subject matter experts on the capabilities and threats in the 
states that would increase his situational awareness during domestic events. 
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2. How has the regional desk officer program improved USNROTHCOM’s 
ability to develop partnerships and integrate the use of military capabilities?   
This secondary question was addressed in the previous chapter.  Russell Linden 
states in his book, Leading Across Boundaries, that “People who collaborate well 
communicate laterally, look for ways to share ideas, and form relationships well.  They 
tend to be natural networkers, understanding that organizational success relies at least as 
much on horizontal as hierarchical relationships” (Linden, 2010).  Chapter IV 
demonstrated how USNORTHCOM improved its ability to cooperate, coordinate, and 
collaborate with its federal and state partners through the development of the regional 
desk officer program.  The regional desk officer program allowed USNORTHCOM to 
build the critical partnerships between organizations within USNORTHCOM as well as 
with its federal and state partners.  This program was successful because it combined the 
activities of leading with the essential elements of partnerships. 
3. The primary research question asked: What are the activities of leading 
and elements of partnerships that the regional desk officer program uses to improve 
USNORTHCOM’s ability to cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate with its federal and 
state partners in order to properly integrate military capabilities for domestic incidents?   
This question was addressed in the literature review and examined during the 
previous chapter.  The key activities of leading and elements of partnerships utilized by 
the regional desk officer program included a combination of building trust, sense making, 
and collaboration.  As Christopher Paprone stated in his article, where military 
professionalism meets complexity science, sense making becomes more important than 
decision making.  Due to the nature of “wicked problems” facing homeland security 
professionals, it is important for people at all levels of the organization to be able to 
“sense” both the issues and the context that surround them.  I believe this is the reason 
that the commander of USNORTHCOM created the regional desk office, because he 
desired to have situational awareness of both the threats and capabilities in the states.  
This would then give him the “sense” of what was going on and what capabilities would 
be requested.  This ability of sense making creates the foundation for a collaborative 
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environment.  Without having a sense of the issues and others’ points of views, you will 
make decisions that are not appropriate (Snowden & Kurtz, 2003).  
It is equally important for leaders to be able to communicate and provide 
guidance to their own organization as well as across boundaries to include all 
stakeholders through a process of “sensegiving.”  This can be accomplish and aided 
through the supporting activities of story telling and negotiating, as seen in the story 
about the RDO.  In order to break down barriers between the regional desk officer and 
the defense coordinating officer and his staff, time was built in during visits to share 
stories during meetings and after hours.  This created an understanding between the 
stakeholders and allowed each side to get an appreciation for the differences in 
perspectives and interests of each side.  This led to a negotiated solution on how the 
partnership would proceed and successfully provide the commander his desired end 
result, which was to provide him quick direct access to information about the states 
during times of crisis.  The bottom line is that these activities helped create “buy-in” to a 
solution that otherwise might not be accomplished.      
In order for sense making and sense giving to work, the one essential element that 
provides the glue that holds most collaborative efforts is relationships.  The point was 
driven home throughout this thesis, from the literature review through every aspect of the 
RDO story.  The director of the regional desk office initial guidance was “to get out and 
form relationships in your assigned regions.”  Relationships are important because 
“collaboration requires considerable give and take and that is more likely to happen when 
good relationships exist” (Linden, 2002).  A second reason is that collaborative efforts 
are difficult; there are many bumps and hurdles along that way, and relationships can 
help carry partners through difficult and unpredictable times (Linden, 2010) (Linden, 
2002).  This point has not been lost on Lieutenant General Jacoby, who has been 
nominated to follow Admiral Winnefeld as the Commander of USNORTHCOM.  In his 
confirmation hearings, Lieutenant General Jacoby stated, “Complex relationships are the 
key to effectiveness” when it comes to USNORTHCOM and NORAD mission areas. 
(Pellerin, 2011). 
 60 
B. RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 
As Linden states, “The most significant challenges facing our society cannot be 
addressed by any one organization.  They all require collaboration among many 
organizations” (Linden, 2002).  Man-made and natural disasters including floods, 
hurricanes, pandemics, tornados, and wildfire are going to occur across this nation.  We 
will not be able to prevent them, but it is how we come together in the face of such 
disasters that will test our resilience as a nation.  When these events occur and the nation 
is in crisis, organizations must coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate their efforts and 
resources to respond and recover from these incidents.  As the NRF states, these efforts 
must take place in times of calm in order to respond effectively together in times of need.  
Therefore, engaged partnerships include ongoing communications and shared situational 
awareness for a more rapid response (DHS, 2008).   
This thesis explored and examined just one case of how a large bureaucratic 
organization (USNORTHCOM) embraced partnership engagements in order to position 
itself to be able to quickly and effectively integrate military capabilities with civil 
organizations in times of crisis to save lives and protect property.  The regional desk 
officer program demonstrated that it is not the characteristics and traits of the leaders in 
the organization, but the activities of leading, combined with elements of partnerships, 
that allow collaboration to occur and partnerships to succeed.  However, this theory is 
based on only one case over a short period of time under one particular commander as 
shown in the timeline below: 
RDO STUDY TIMELINE 
MAY 2010 JUN 2010 NOV 2010 FEB 2011 JUL 2011 AUG 2011 
___|___________|____________|___________|___________|_____________|________ 
ADM Winnefeld RDO Concept Implementation RDO Operational  **Data Collection GEN Jacoby 
Takes Command Phase begins of RDO Concept Phase Begins Ends  Takes Command of 
NORAD and    *Data Collection     NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM   Begins      USNORTHCOM 
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Also the study took place in only one of the ten FEMA regions; therefore,  
additional research is needed to determine if the actions could also be attributed to the 
environment, the timing, and the particular people involved in this region in addition to 
the activities of leading and elements of partnerships they used.    Future research should 
also  examine whether this case can stand  the test of time, change of commanders, and 
the pressures of a large-scale domestic crisis.  This additional research will determine 
whether this is an effective viable process that can be duplicated in other organizations.     
C. CONCLUSION 
Partnerships take both the activities of leading combined with the elements of 
partnerships to be successful, and they can occur at any level in the organization, at 
anytime.  However, partnering and leading require many skills and flexibility to work, 
which makes them difficult to perform well.  If they were easy, then everyone would do 
it.  They both ask much of the people involved.  It is about give and take, sensing your 
surroundings and the environment, which takes experience and an open mind.  
Collaboration is difficult because it requires you to give up some control in order for the 
whole to accomplish what the parts could not do separately.  It takes trust, willingness, 
desire and the right communication skills to make it possible.  It is also about building 
relationships and sustaining them for the long haul.  We all realize from our own lives 
how much work and effort that can take, but the results and payoffs can make it all 
worthwhile.  As David Snowden is fond of saying, “We are all made up of our past 
experience that bring forces upon us that we are unaware of and don’t fully understand” 
(Snowden and Kurtz , 2003).   It is therefore our ability to sense what needs to be done at 
the right time and place that can help secure this country and the American people, and 
make it more resilient against man-made or natural disasters. 
The United States is the world’s fourth largest nation, with 3.5 million square 
miles of land and 88,000 miles of tidal shoreline.  Each year, 11.2 million trucks and 2.2 
million railcars cross into the U.S. from the 7,500-mile land and air border shared with 
Canada and Mexico.  More than 7,500 foreign-flag ships make 51,000 calls annually to 
U.S. ports, and the country routinely admits millions of visitors from around the world.  
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However, the freedom America enjoys, employs in its commerce, and extends to non-
U.S. citizens presents homeland security challenges (USNORTHCOM, 2011). 
On the other hand, the sheer size and incredible diversity of this country, 
combined with the strength of the U.S. economy, means that the nation has many 
resources and capabilities that can come to bear on the wicked problems of homeland 
security and national preparedness.  However, it takes the activities of leading and 
partnering with each other to efficiently bring these resources together in an effective 
manner during a crisis.  As Raphael Sagarin explains in his article on evolution,  
If the genus Americanus want to overcome this latest challenge to its 
existence, it must adapt its….mechanisms accordingly.   
An organism can survive, and thrive, in the presence of an enemy by 
forming symbiotic relationships that can take a multitude of forms. 
(Sagarin, 2003)   
Therefore, it is vitally important for organizations throughout the homeland 
security enterprise to develop and maintain these strategic partnerships that will allow the 





Advisory Panel on DoD Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities. (2010). Before 
Disaster Strikes – Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities. Washington. 
ARNORTH. (2010, June 1). Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook. 6–
14. Ft. Sam Houston, TX: ARNORTH. 
Bellavita, Christopher (1991). The Public Administrator as Hero. Administration & 
Society, 23, 155–185. 
Brokaw, Tom (2011, April 1). Libya "The beginning, not the end". The Today Show. (M. 
F. Lauer, Interviewer) NBC – Today Show. New York. 
Campbell, J. (1968). The hero with a thousand faces. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Chittipeddi, Kumar and Gioia, Dennis (1991, September). Sensemaking and Sensegiving 
in Strategic Change Initiation. Retrieved May 11, 2011, from Wiley-Blackwell: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2486479 
Covey, Stephen. M.R. (2006). The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes 
Everything. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
D'Agostino, D. (2010). Homeland Defense – DoD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify 
Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. Washington: General 
Accounting Office. 
Deloitte. (n.d.). Change your world or the worls will change you –  The future of 
collaborative government and Web 2.0. Retrieved March 4, 2011, from 
http://deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Canada/Local%20Assets/Documents/ca_govt_web20_mar08_EN.pdf 
Dept. of the Army. (2009, August 14). US Army North Joint Forces Land Component 
Command Regulation 10-1. U.S. Army North Organization and Functions, 25-1 – 
25–3. Ft. Sam Houston, TX: Depart of the Army. 
DHS. (2008). National Response Framework. Washington, DC: DHS. 
FEMA. (2011). FEMA, Defense Coordinating Officer and Defense Coordinating 
Element. Retrieved July 30, 2011, from FEMA: 
http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/regionv/dco_dce.shtm 
Fullan, M. (2001). Leading in a Culture of Change. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 64 
Glaser, B. (2009, June 1). The Novice GT Researcher. Grounded Theory Review, 1–21. 
Gray, B. (1989). Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems,. San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Harford, T. (2011, July). Tim Harford: Trial, error, and the god complex. Retrieved July 
18, 2011, from TED Videos - ideas worth spreading: 
http://www.ted.com/talks/tim_harford.html 
Horn, Robert (2001). A presentation to the "Foundations in the Knowledge Economy". 
Retrieved January 27, 2011, from at the David and Lucile Packard Foundation 
(online): http://www.stanford.edu/~rhorn/a/recent/spcKnwldgPACKARD.pdf 
Jolliffe, R. (2010). DoD Civil Support During the 2007 and 2008 California Wild Land 
Fires (D-2010-015). Washington: DoD Office of Inspector General. 
Kanter, R. (1994, July–August). Collaborative Advantage: The ARt of Alliances. 
Harvard Business Review, 96–108. 
Lasker, Roz, Weiss, Elisa, and Miller, Rebecca (2001).  Partnership Synergy: A Practical 
Framework for Studying and Strengthening the Collaborative Advantage, 
Retrieved July 13 2011, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3350547 
 
 Marcus, Leonard, D. Barry, and J. Hendershon  (2006). Meta-Leadership and National 
Emergency Preparedness: A Model to Build Government Connectivety. 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense, Strategy, Practice, and Science, 4, 
128–133. 
Lictenstein, Uhl-Bien, Seers, Orton, and Scheiber (2006). Complexity Leadership 
Theory: An interactive perspective on leading in complex adaptive systems. 
Emergence: Complexity and Organization, vol. 8, no. 4, 2–12. 
Linden, R. (2010). Leading Across Boundaries. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Linden, R. (2002). Working Across Boundaries: Making Collaboration Work in 
Government and non-profit organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Linden, R. (2002). Working Across Boundaries: Making Collaboration Work in 
Government and Nonprofit Organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Mays, G. P., Halverson, P. K., and Kaluzny, A. D. (1998).  Collaboration to Improve 
Community Health: Trends and Alternative Models, Retrieved from the Journal 
of Qualtiy Improvement, 24: 518–540 
 
McLaughlin, D. and LeCompte, M.  (1993). Ethnography and qualitative design in 
educational research (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press. 
 65 
Mulcock, Jane and Hume, Lynne  (2005). Anthropologists in the Field, Cases in 
Participant Observation. New York: Columbia University Press. 
National Park Service. (2010). National Park S-service Ethnography Program. Retrieved 
November 29, 2010, from NPS Ethnographic Research Center: 
http://www.nps.gov/history/ethnography/aah/AAheritage/ERCf.htm 
NGB. (2011, March 7). National Guard News. Retrieved July 30, 2011, from Guard, 
NORTHCOM leadership concept will improve disaster responses: 
http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2011/03/030711-Northcom-print.aspx 
Paparone, C., Anderson, A., McDaniel, R. (2007, November 30).  Where Military 
Professionalism Meets Complexity Science, Retrieved May 18, 2011 from Armed 
Forces & Society: http://afs.sagepub.com/content/34/3/433 
Pellerin, C. (2011, July 28). American Press Service. Retrieved August 5, 2011, from 
Jacoby: Relationships Drive Northcom, NORAD Missions: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64846 
Regine, B and Lewin, R.  (2000). The Soul at Work. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Rosenbaum, D. (2002). Evaluating Multi-Agency Anti-crime Partnerships: Theory, 
Design, and Measurement Issues. Crime Prevention Studies, 14, 171–225. 
Sargarin, Raphael (2003, September 1).  Adapt or Die, Retrieved Dec 11, 2010 from 
Foreign Policy Magazine, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2003/09/01/adpat_or_die 
 
Schedsul, Jean J., and LeCompte, Margaret D.  (1999). Designing and Conducting 
Ethnograpic Research. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press. 
Scott, W. (2007). Use of DoD Resources to Support Hurricane Katrina Disaster (D-
2007-002). Washington: DoD Inspector General. 
Senge, P. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. 
New York: Doubleday/Currency. 
Sibthorpe, Beverly, Glasgow, Nicholas, and Longstaff, Duncan (2004, October).  
Complex Adaptive Systems: A Different Way of Thinking about Health Care 
Systems, Retrieved on 15 Oct 2011 from Australian Primary Health Care 
Research Institute, http://anu.edu/aphcri 
 
Snowden, David and Kurtz, C. F.. (2003). The new dynamics of strategy: Sensemaking in 
a complex and complicated world. IBM Systems Journal, 42, no. 3), 462–483. 
Snowden, D. (2009). Retrieved July 10, 2011, from You Tube. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7oz366xo-8 
 66 
Snowden, David and Boone, D. (2007, November 1).  A Leader’s Framework for 
Decision Making, Retrieved from http://hbr.org/product/a-leader-s-framework-
for-decision-making-harvard-b/an/R01711C-PDF-ENG 
 
Spekman, Robert and Mohr, James (1994). Characteristics of Partnership Success: 
Partnership Attributes, Communication Behavior, and Conflict Resolution 
Techniques. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 135–152. 
Spradley, J. (1979). The Ethnographic Interview. New York: Rinehart & Winston. 
Strauss, Anselm and Glasser, Barney (1967). The Discovery of Ground Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 
USCG. (2011, July 19). United States Coast Guard Biographies of Flag Officers / SES 
Personnel. Retrieved July 30, 2011, from Biography of RADM Dan Abel – 
Deputy Director of Operations USNORTHCOM: 
http://www.uscg.mil/flag/NORTHCOM.asp 
USNORTHCOM. (2011). About U.S. NORTHCOM. Retrieved June 8, 2010, from United 
States Northern Command: 
http://www.northcom.mil/About/history_education/history.html 
USNORTHCOM. (2011). About USNORTHCOM. Retrieved July 1, 2011, from U.S. 
Northern Command: http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html 
USNORTHCOM. (2011, February 7). Guard Leaders Discuss Contingency Dual Status 
Commanders concept at JFHQ-NCR. Retrieved July 30, 2011, from 
http://www.northcom.mil/news/2011/020711.html 
USNORTHCOM. (2011, June 28). HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM Organization and 
Functions – Interagency Coordiantion Directorate. NORAD and USNORTHCOM 
Mission Directive 5, 1–4. Peterson AFB, CO: USNORTHCOM. 
USNORTHCOM. (2009, August 03). Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations 
Program. USNORTHCOM Instruction 40-206, 1–6. Peterson AFB, CO: 
USNORTHCOM. 
USNORTHCOM. (2010, December). United States Northern Command Homepage. 
Retrieved June 26, 2011, from Missions and History: www.northcom.mil 
USNORTHCOM. (2011). USNORTHCOM Domestic Operations External Portal Page. 
Retrieved July 30, 2011, from Domestic Operations: 
https://operations.noradnorthcom.mil/sites/NCJ3DOMOPS/default.aspx 
USNORTHCOM. (2011). USNORTHCOM External Operations Portal. Retrieved July 
30, 2011, from Current Operations Portal Page: 
https://operations.noradnorthcom.mil/Operations/default.aspx 
 67 




Webber, Melvin and Rittel, Horst (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. 
Policy Science, 155–169. 
Wheatley, M. J. (1999). Leadership and the New Science (2nd ed.). San Francisco: 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 
White House. (2006, February). Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned Report. Retrieved 
August 8, 2010, from George Bush White House Archives: http://georgebush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lesson-learned/chapter5.html 
White House. (2006, February 23). The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned. Retrieved June 22, 2011, from George W. Bush White House Archives: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/Katrina-lessons-learned 
Winnefeld, A. (2011, April 6). Transcript of ADM Winnefeld's Remarks to the World 
Affairs Council. Retrieved April 21, 2011, from USNORTHCOM: 
http://www.northcom.mil/News/Transcripts/042011.html 




Zaccarro, S. J., Gilbert, J. A., Thor, K. K., and Mumford, M. D. (1976).  Self-monitoring 
and trait-based variance in leadership: An investigation of leader flexibility 
across multiple group situations.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 308–315. 
 68 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 69 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
